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1. TERRORISM AND CYBERTERRORISM AS LEGAL CONCEPTS
A. Impact of Technology on the Notion of Terrorism
The international law framework surrounding terrorism existed well
before 9/11. Out of the eighteen international instruments (including
amendments) 1 adopted since 1963, thirteen existed before 2001. Though
it seems obvious that the attack on the World Trade Center and other
events within the United States served as catalysts for the development
of serious international documents such as the 2005 Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and 2006 United Nations
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the documents were built upon
previously existing legal foundations. 2
The extent to which general principles of international law pertaining
to terrorism have changed since 9/11 can be described as one-sided, as
1. International Legal Instruments to Counterterrorism, U.N. ACTION TO
COUNTER TERRORISM, http://www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml (last visited
Aug. 21, 2012).
2. See, e.g., Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], 2010 Convention on the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation, Sept. 10, 2010,
ICAO Doc. 9960; ICAO, 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed On Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, ICAO Doc. 8364; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Jan. 26, 1973, 974
U.N.T.S. 178; U.N. Secretary-General, International Convention for the Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, U.N. GAOR (Apr. 13, 2005); Int’l Atomic Energy Agency
[IAEA], Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, May 1, 1980, IAEA
Doc. INFCIRC/274/Rev.1; Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], 2005 Protocol to the Protocol for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf, July 28, 2010; IMO, 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Nov. 1, 2005,
IMO Doc. LEG/Conf.15/22.
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some elements have not changed at all (as evidenced by the failure to
adopt the UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism
due to a deadlock over the definition of terrorism), while other elements
changed drastically (e.g., express recognition by the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) in Resolutions 1368 and 1373 of the right to
self-defense in response to a terrorist attack by a non-state actor). 3 If a
cyberterrorist-attack would reach at least the same threshold as the 9/11
attacks, there is serious reason to believe that legal approach will be the
same as for Al-Qaeda attacks themselves: rapid development of law on
the basis of an already-existing base.
Some authors today believe that there is no imminent cyberterrorism
threat. 4 It is true that cyber-attacks have not officially set the record in
terms of severe casualties yet 5 and on the outside they resemble ordinary
cyber-attacks. 6 In fact, there is a great gap between the presumed danger
and the known cyberterrorism activities.7 However, with quick evolution
of technologies, it is only a matter of time 8 before the danger of lifethreatening cyberterrorism manifests itself.

3. See generally Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J.
INT’L. L. 32 (2003).
4. See Massimo Mauro, Threat Assessment and Protective Measures: Extending
the Asia–Europe Meeting IV Conclusions on Fighting International Terrorism and Other
Instruments to Cyber Terrorism, in CYBERWAR, NETWAR AND THE REVOLUTION IN
MILITARY AFFAIRS 219, 221 (Edward Halpin et al. eds., 2006); see Dorothy Dennings, A
View of Cyberterrorism Five Years Later, in R EADINGS IN I NTERNET S ECURITY:
HACKING, COUNTERHACKING, AND SOCIETY (K. Himma ed., 2006), cited in Eneken Tikk,
Comprehensive Legal Approach to Cyber Security, 35 DISSERTATIONES JURIDICAE
UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS 22 (2011).
5. Hai-Cheng Chu, Der-Jiunn Deng, Han-Chieh Chao & Yueh-Min Huang, Next
Generation of Terrorism: Ubiquitous Cyber Terrorism with the Accumulation of All
Intangible Fears, 15 J. UNIVERSAL COMPUTER SCI. 2373, 2373–86 (2009).
6. Dorothy E. Denning, Terror’s Web: How the Internet Is Transforming Terrorism,
in HANDBOOK ON INTERNET CRIME 198 (Yvonne Jewkes & Majid Yar eds., 2009).
7. Anna-Maria Talihärm, Cyber Terrorism: in Theory or in Practice?, 3.2
DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM REV. 59, 62 (2010).
8. FBI Director Robert Mueller opines that the cyber terrorism threat is “rapidly
expanding.” Vineetha Menon, FBI: Cyber Terrorism Threat Is ‘Rapidly Expanding’,
ITP.NET (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.itp.net/579523-fbi-cyber-terrorism-threat-is-rapidlyexpanding, cited in Tikk, supra note 4, at 25.
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B. Lack of a Common Definition
The lack of a universally accepted definition of terrorism is an
obstacle in describing the nature of cyberterrorism 9 without referring to
conventional terrorism. Generally, a common definition is required for
two reasons: firstly, to definitively determine the status of customary law
pertaining to the use of force in relation to acts of terror; and secondly,
to criminalize such acts, 10 i.e. to prevent terrorism, to condemn it, and to
punish it. Worth noting is also that international demand to extradite a
terrorist offender far exceeds pressure to extradite a common criminal. 11
The various suggestions made by academics on how to define this
concept are only partially overlapping and range from those including
social aspects (terrorism is motivated by “egoism, intolerance, lack of
dialogue and inhumanity, greed and accountability”) 12 or psychological
ones (“terrorism is a tactic to coerce behavioral change in an adversary”) 13
to very thorough legal approaches (“one must distinguish between attitude
[and] methods” 14 of terrorism).
This is further complicated by the definition recommended by the
UN’s High-Level Panel in its Report on Threats, Challenges and Change
of 2004. The panel concluded that a definition in the upcoming
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism should include a
description of terrorism as “any action, in addition to actions already specified
by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions
and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or

9. Jeff Addicott, Terrorism Law: Materials, Cases, Comments, 6th Edition,
CENTER FOR TERRORISM LAW ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION: CYBER SECURITY 1 (2011),
available at www.stmarytx.edu/law/pdf/CLEAddicott.pdf.
10. See also Clive Walker, The Legal Definition of “Terrorism” in United
Kingdom Law and Beyond, 2007 PUB. L. 331, 336 (2007).
11. LAWRENCE T. GREENBERG ET AL., INFORMATION WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 21-33 (1998), cited in Daniel M. Creekman, A Helpless America? An Examination
of the Legal Options Available to the United States in Response to Varying Types of
Cyber Attacks from China, 17 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 663 (2002).
12. PAUL MEDHURST, GLOBAL TERRORISM: A COURSE PRODUCED BY THE UNITED
NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH 1 (2000), cited in Harry R. Jackson,
Understanding Terrorism (unpublished thesis, Peace Operations Training Institute),
available at http://media.peaceopstraining.org/theses/jackson.pdf.
13. Laurence Andrew Dobrot, The Global War on Terrorism: A Religious War?,
STRATEGIC STUD. INST. 6 (2007), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.
mil/pdffiles/pub822.pdf.
14. Jean-Marc Sorel, Some Questions About The Definition of Terrorism and The Fight
Against its Financing, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 365, 371 (2003); see also G.A. Res. 51/210,
¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (Dec. 17, 1996) (“Reiterates that criminal acts intended or
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or
particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable . . . .”).
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serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such
an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a
Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any
act.” 15

In a 2005 Report “In Larger Freedom,” 16 Kofi Annan endorsed this
suggestion, noting that “[i]t is time to set aside debates on so-called
‘State terrorism’ [and] the right to resist occupation must be understood
in its true meaning.” It is worth noting that although the High-Level
Panel explicitly asks for the “definition” contained in the SC Resolution
1566 to be included, 17 Security Council Resolution 1566 itself clearly
favors the sectoral approach, i.e. it refers directly to the existing
conventions on terrorism. 18
However, from the legal perspective, the ex-Secretary-General’s
suggestions are supportive rather than innovative, since a similar coredefinition (partially resembling one of the 1937 Convention for the
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism that never entered into force)
contained in the draft of the Comprehensive Convention on International
Terrorism remained unchanged 19 since 2001:

15. U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility:
Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ¶ 164(d), U.N. Doc.
A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
16. U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom, ¶ 91, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar.
21, 2005), at ¶ 91.
17. U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility:
Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 15, at
¶ 164(c).
18. See S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004) (“Recalls that
criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or
serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror
in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a
population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain
from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the
international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances
justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,
religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not
prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave
nature.”).
19. Compare Ad Hoc Comm. established pursuant to resolution 51/210, art. 2,
para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/57/37 (2010), with U.N. Report of the Working Group, Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism, U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., art. 2, para. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/65/L.10 (Nov. 3, 2010); see also ALEX CONTE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PREVENTION
AND PUNISHMENT OF TERRORISM 25 (2010).
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Any person commits an offence within the meaning of the
present Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and
intentionally, causes:
a. Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
b. Serious damage to public or private property, including a
place of public use, a State or government facility, a public
transportation system, an infrastructure facility or to the
environment; or
c. Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to
in paragraph 1(b) of the present article resulting or likely to
result in major economic loss,
when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to
intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
The draft also suggests criminalizing threats, attempts, and organization of
these acts, as well as assistance and participation in them. 20
The fact that the core of this definition is not widely disputed (the
deadlock is mostly the result of disagreements over applicability of the
convention to states and their armed forces, as well as liberation
movements), 21 may suggest that this draft reflects the current state of
customary international law pertaining to terrorism. This definition is
indeed incorporating common elements of self-made legal definitions
employed, e.g., by the European Union, 22 African Union, 23 South Asian

20. G.A. Res. 51/210, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/57/37 (2010).
21. See generally U.N. Report of the Working Group, Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism, U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/65/L.10 (Nov. 3,
2010); see generally Report of the Ad Hoc Comm. established pursuant to resolution
51/210 (Dec. 17, 1996), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/66/37 (2011); see U.N.
GAOR, 66th Sess. Supp. No. 37, U.N. Doc. A/66/37, at 5 n.9 (Apr. 11–15, 2011), cited
in U.N. GAOR 66th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/66/478 (Nov. 15, 2011), available at
http://www.eyeontheun.org/assets/attachments/documents/10010reportmterr.pdf.
22. EU Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, art. 1, 2002 O.J. (L
164/3) 2; see also Steven Best & Anthony J. Nocella II, Defining Terrorism, 2 ANIMAL
LIBERATION PHIL. & POL’Y J. 1, 3 (2004), available at http://ww.drstevebest.org/Defining
Terrorism.pdf.
23. Organization of African Unity [OAU], Convention on the Prevention and
Combating of Terrorism art.1, ¶ 3, July 14, 1999, available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/
default/files/OAU_CONVENTION_PREVENTION_COMBATING_TERRORISM.pdf.

144

SHIRYAEV PAGES EDIT (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 14: 139, 2012]

10/24/2016 4:56 PM

Cyberterrorism
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

Association for Regional Cooperation, 24 and Commonwealth of
Independent States. 25
However, the question is whether the suggested definition unreasonably
loosens the already-existing international law regime criminalizing acts
of terror. This is particularly relevant in relation to cyber-attacks.
As mentioned above, there are currently eighteen universal legal
documents 26 in force meant to prevent terrorist acts. 27 All of these
instruments seem to concentrate on acts perpetrated by non-state actors
from a criminal law perspective (aut dedere aut judicare—extradite or

24. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation [SAARC], Regional Convention
on Suppression of Terrorism, art. I, Nov. 4, 1987, available at http://treaties.un.org/
doc/db/Terrorism/Conv18-english.pdf.
25. Treaty on Cooperation Among the States Members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States in Combating Terrorism, art. 1, June 4, 1999, available at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/csi-english.pdf.
26. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20.3 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22.2 U.S.T. 1641, 860
U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, supra note 2; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973,
28.2 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, 1456 U.N.T.S. 101, 18 I.L.M. 1419; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10,
1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 201, 27 I.L.M. 672; Convention on the Marking of Plastic
Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1991, 2122
U.N.T.S. 359; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,
opened for signature Jan. 12, 1998, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256; International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, opened for signature Jan. 10, 2000, 2178
U.N.T.S. 197; International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism, opened for signature Sept. 15, 2005, 2445 U.N.T.S. 89, 44 I.L.M. 815;
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil
Aviation, supra note 2; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304,
27 I.L.M. 685; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports
Serving International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; IMO, Protocol to
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, supra note 2; IMO, Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Oct. 14,
2005, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/14; Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Sept. 10, 2010, 50 I.L.M. 141.
27. See also U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility: Rep. of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change, ¶ 164(b), U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) (“Acts under the . . .
preceding anti-terrorism conventions are terrorism, and a . . . crime under international
law.”).
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adjudicate 28), sometimes without and sometimes loosely referring to the
intent or purpose of the terrorist conduct29 (terrorizing general population or
compelling a government to perform or abstain from an act).
Introduction of the definition contained in the Draft Comprehensive
Convention is unlikely to reverse criminalization of terrorist acts
committed without such intent, since the twelve Conventions and their
protocols will remain in force 30 (unless explicitly stated otherwise in the
Comprehensive Convention). Nevertheless, this definition may damage
the notion that seems to exist in customary international law (evidenced
by the existence of the conventions on terrorism per se 31) that certain
acts by their very nature are so severe that they can be considered
terrorism, even if committed without a global purpose. In effect, this
will prevent any other equally grave act (also in or through cyber-space)
to be criminalized as terrorism, if it is not subject to the “purpose of
conduct” criteria.
Until the Comprehensive Convention is adopted, however, the existing
conventions on terrorism, including cyberterrorism, remain in the center
of the legal framework. Without these instruments, “terrorism” would
indeed be, as Rosalyn Higgins puts it, “a term without any legal significance,
. . . merely a convenient way of alluding to activities . . . widely disapproved
of . . . .” 32
C. Defining Cyberterrorism as a Dependent Variable
What distinguishes cyberterrorism from conventional terrorism is the
use of (mostly internet-based) computer networks. 33 In essence, it is the
use of electronic links in order to carry out terrorist attacks, usually
involving programs created for that purpose. These programs can be
delivered to their destination either through Internet, portable storagedevices (such as USB cards), wireless radio signals, or other similar means.

28. See BIBI VAN GINKEL, THE PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN COMBATING
TERRORISM FROM 1946 TO 2008: QUESTIONS OF LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 11 (2010).
29. Andrew Byrnes, Faculty of Law, Australian National University, Apocalyptic
Visions and the Law: The Legacy of September 11, Inaugural Lecture, Centre for
International and Public Law 11 (2002), https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/bitstream/
1885/41104/3/Byrnes30May02.pdf.
30. Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United
Against Terrorism, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 323, 373 (2009).
31. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law
and Withdrawal Rights in an Age of Treaties, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1 (2010).
32. Rosalyn Higgins, The General International Law of Terrorism, in TERRORISM
& INT’L L. 28 (Rosalyn Higgins & Maurice Flory eds., 1997).
33. See S.S. Raghay, Cyber Security in India’s Counter Terrorism Strategy,
INTEGRATED DEFENSE STAFF 2 (Sept. 15, 2012), ids.nic.in/art_by_offids/Cyber security
in india by Col SS Raghav.pdf.
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Cyberterrorism should be viewed separately from the terrorist use of
the Internet, which involves such aspects as communication,34 recruitment,
funding, organization of physical attacks, 35 propaganda (also in the form
of “hacktivism” 36), incitement to terrorism, 37 and apology of terrorism.
At the same time, certain cyber-operations (e.g., intrusions into critical
infrastructure databases to collect information on vulnerable targets) can
further cyberextremists’ cause, 38 but are not acts of cyberterrorism on
their own. Scholars like Conway (who builds on Anderson’s suggestion),
also propose dividing cyber-attacks into Internet “use” (expression of
ideas and communication), “misuse” (disrupting or compromising websites
or infrastructure), “offensive use” (using Internet to cause damage or
engage in theft), and “cyberterrorism.” 39
The term “cyberterrorism” itself predates 9/11, 40 although lack of
universal definitions of “cyber-attack” and “terrorism” has resulted in
every expert having his own understanding of the term. 41 The confusion
has been exacerbated by the media which has the tendency of randomly
characterizing minor cyber-attacks as “cyberterrorism.” 42

34. James A. Lewis, The Internet and Terrorism, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 112, 114
(2005) (“One of the characteristics of terrorist websites is their ability to manage rapid
changes of Internet addresses. When authorities force a site to move, informal networks
based on chatrooms or e-mail inform the group’s supporters of the new network
address.”); see also TIMOTHY F. O’HARA, CYBER WARFARE: CYBER TERRORISM 114
(2004).
35. See Elina Noor, The Problem with Cyber Terrorism, 2 SOUTHEAST ASIA
REGIONAL CTR. FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM 51, 52 (2011).
36. See Varvara Mitliaga, Cyber-terrorism: A Call for Governmental Action?,
BRITISH AND IRISH LAW, EDUCATION & TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION 5 (2001), http://www.
bileta.ac.uk/01papers/mitliaga.html (describing hacktivism as “using hacking techniques
to disrupt normal functions of systems, without causing serious damage, aiming at
dissemination of propaganda and expression of political opinions”).
37. See Yaël Ronen, Incitement to Terrorist Acts and International Law, 23
LEIDEN J. INT’L L., 645, 654 (2010).
38. Roland Heickerö, Terrorism Online and the Change of Modus Operandi,
SWEDISH DEFENCE RESEARCH AGENCY 7 (Sept. 15, 2012), http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/
conferences/pdf-conf334.pdf.
39. Maura Conway, Terrorism and IT: Cyberterrorism and Terrorist Organisations
Online 6 (2003) (paper prepared for presentation at the International Studies Association
Annual International Convention in Portland, Oregon).
40. Sam Berner, Cyber-Terrorism: Reality or Paranoia?, 5 S. AFR. J. INFO. MGMT.
1, 1 (2003).
41. Ali Jahangiri, Cyberspace, Cyberterrorism and Information Warfare: A Perfect
Recipe for Confusion, WORLDWIDE SECURITY CONFERENCE 6: BACKGROUND MATERIALS
AND SELECTED SPEAKERS NOTES 29 (2009).
42. Talihärm, supra note 7, at 63.
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As in the case of “terrorism”, academics have proposed a wide array
of possible definitions that could cover this concept. The suggestions
include those concentrating on the disruptive 43 and destabilizing 44 nature
of cyberterrorism, limiting it only to individuals and non-state perpetrators,45
focusing on wider psychological effects (fear), 46 malware writing
process, 47 involving attacks on critical national infrastructures, 48 and
attacks damaging networks themselves. 49 There have also been opinions
expressed that the concept of cyberterrorism has no right to exist at all,
since terrorism requires a physical attack. 50
A lot of these definitions are over-inclusive or under-inclusive. For
example, Stanford Draft International Convention to Enhance Protection
from Cyber Crime and Terrorism of 2000 defines cyberterrorism as
intentional use or threat of use, without legally recognized authority, of violence,
disruption or interference against cyber systems, when it is likely that such use
would result in death or injury of a person or persons, substantial damage to
physical property, civil disorder, or significant economic harm. 51

43. Rohas Nagpal, President of Asian School of Cyber Laws, Cyber Terrorism in
the Context of Globalization 3 (Sept. 2002) (paper presented at World Congress on
Informatics and Law), available at http://www.barzallo.com/DOCUMENTOS%20WEB/
DOCTRINA/General/delitos%20inform_ticos/DocPDF/Nagpal,%20Rohas.II%20Congre
so%20Mundial%20Derecho%20Informatico%20Madrid.pdf.
44. Natasha Solce, The Battlefield of Cyberspace: The Inevitable New Military
Branch: The Cyber Force, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 293, 301 (2008).
45. Daniel T. Kuehl, The National Information Infrastructure: The Role of the
Department of Defense in Defending It, in TRANSNATIONAL THREATS: BLENDING LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND MILITARY STRATEGIES 151 (Carolyn W. Pumphrey ed., 2000).
46. See Christopher Beggs, Cyber-Terrorism: A Threat to Australia?, in MANAGING
MODERN ORGANIZATIONS THROUGH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
2005 INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
472 (2005); see Maura Conway, Cyberterrorism: Media Myth or Clear and Present
Danger? 5 (2004), http://doras.dcu.ie/505/1/media_myth_2004.pdf.
47. Alistair Kelman, The Regulation of Virus Research and the Prosecution for
Unlawful Research?, 3 J. INFO. L. & TECH. (1997), available at http://elj.warwick.
ac.uk/jilt/compcrim/97-3kelm/, cited in Mathias Klang, A Critical Look at the Regulation
of Computer Viruses, 11 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH., 162, 167 (2003).
48. Gabriel Weimann, Cyberterrorsim: The Sum of All Fears?, 28 STUD. IN
CONFLICT & TERRORISM 129, 130 (2005), cited in Clive Walker, Cyber-Terrorism: Legal
Principle and Law in the United Kingdom, 110 PENN ST. L. REV., 625, 634 (2006).
49. Gabriel Weimann, Cyberterrorsim: The Sum of All Fears?, 28 STUD. IN
CONFLICT & TERRORISM 129, 130 (2005), cited in Clive Walker, Cyber-Terrorism: Legal
Principle and Law in the United Kingdom, 110 PENN ST. L. REV., 625, 634 (2006).
50. J. P. I. A. G. Charvat, Cyber Terrorism: A New Dimension in Battlespace,
CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE DEFENCE AGAINST TERRORISM 7 (2009), available at http://
www.ccdcoe.org/publications/virtualbattlefield/05_CHARVAT_Cyber%20Terrorism.pdf.
51. Abraham D. Sofaer et al., A Proposal for an International Convention on Cyber
Crime and Terrorism 26 (Aug. 2000) (paper presented at the Stanford Conference at Stanford
University), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/11912/sofaer goodman.pdf.
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According to this definition, an angry employee smashing vital SIS
(MI6) computers containing dossiers on its agents with a sledgehammer
would be a “cyberterrorist,” since he commits intentional violence that
disrupts cyber-systems and causes substantial damage to a state. In reality,
however, the way violence is carried out in this theoretical example
(physically and not through electronic network), would rule out the
possibility of cyberterrorism.
At the same time, a virus that causes deliberate release of radioactive
material into the environment, but with a low risk of human contamination,
would fall outside the scope of the Stanford’s definition, while it is
explicitly criminalized as a terrorist act by Article 2(1)(b)(ii) of the 2005
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
Taking all these factors into account, from a legal perspective, the best
definition that would describe the notion of (conventional) cyberterrorism
today is: the use of electronic networks taking the form of a cyber-attack
to commit a) a substantive act criminalized by the existing legal instruments
prohibiting terrorism, or b) an act of terrorism under international customary
law.
To put this definition into context, it is essential to establish who the
possible perpetrators are and what objects are likely to be targeted when
it comes to cyberterrorism.
II. POTENTIAL PERPETRATORS
Cyber-attacks are impossible without necessary technology and a
minimal knowledge (at least by one person) of how electronic networks
operate. Since more than two billion people on Earth have access to the
Internet, and hacking and cracking manuals are available online, everyone
including self-taught individuals, groups, large non-state actors,
corporations, and states, 52 at least in theory, can engage in cyber-attacks.
A. States
Controversy regarding possible direct state involvement in conventional
acts of terrorism seems less actual when viewed within the context of
cyber-space. While the Draft Comprehensive Convention remains

52. See Peter Flemming & Michael Stohl, Myths and Realities of Cyberterrorism,
in COUNTERING TERRORISM THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 70-105 (Alex P. Schmid ed., 2001).
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deadlocked on this issue, 53 neither of the eighteen existing legal instruments
foresee state responsibility for an act of terrorism, so one must turn to
international customary law for guidance.
Initially, state terrorism, which can even be the cause of anti-state
extremism, has been included in the discussions regarding the definition
for three reasons: firstly, due to a historically different meaning of this
concept; secondly, because states cause wider destruction in comparison
to non-state actors; and finally, since certain forms of violence against
civilians occur as part of the counter-terrorism campaigns. 54
“State terrorism” may be divided into two categories: internal and
external. Within historical context, “internal state terrorism” entailed the
use of force against its own civilian population to weaken the morale and
destroy willingness to resist the government’s will, while “external state
terrorism” targeted foreign populations. 55 Situations where a state uses
cyber-attacks against its civilians are very unlikely, as they would be
very inefficient: firstly, physical “punishment” is easier to carry out and
it creates more fear (e.g., it is much easier to order the soldiers to shoot
down a civilian airplane than to use cyber-attacks against it), and
secondly, a significant part of civilian infrastructure usually belongs to
the state itself. In situations where governments do not have effective
control over some part of their territory due to foreign occupation or
civil war, Geneva Conventions would automatically apply and state
violence would have to be viewed within the framework of international
humanitarian law (this will be further discussed in a separate sub-chapter
below). The notion of “external state terrorism,” on the other hand, is
unlikely to crystallize in customary law in the future, since customary
norms arise from state behavior and require their acceptance. It would
seem that a majority of countries today believe a state cannot be a

53. Compare the western draft (“the activities undertaken by the military forces of
a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other
rules of international law, are not governed by this Convention”) with the OIC version
(“The activities undertaken by the military forces of a State in the exercise of their
official duties, inasmuch as they are in conformity with international law, are not
governed by this Convention.”). See U.N. Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm., 6th Sess., Jan.
28–Feb. 1, 2002, U.N. Doc. A/57/37 Annex IV; GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 37 (2002);
see also U.N. Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm., 14th Sess., Apr. 12–16, 2010, U.N. Doc.
A/65/37; GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. No. 37 (2010). For more information, also see
previous and subsequent reports. Note that the Maritime Convention as amended by the
2005 Protocol (Article 2bis(2)), 2005 Nuclear Terrorism Convention (Article 4(2)), 2010
New Civil Aviation Convention (Article 6(2)) and the Unlawful Seizure Convention as
amended by the 2010 Protocol (Article 3bis(2)) all use the western wording.
54. See generally RICHARD JACKSON, LEE JARVIS, JEROEN GUNNING & MARIE
BREEN SMYTH, TERRORISM: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (2011).
55. DONALD J. HANLE, TERRORISM: THE NEWEST FACE OF WARFARE 164 (Yonah
Alexander ed., 1989).
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perpetrator of conventional terrorism, as evidenced by the large number
of signatories to the existing twelve conventions and their protocols
without reservations regarding this matter (with minor exceptions 56).
Therefore, the theory of state terrorism that may be viable in relation to
conventional extremism does not apply in cyber-space.
This does not rule out the possibility of indirect state involvement in
the form of state-sponsored cyberterrorism. It must be said that allowing
their territories to be used for acts against the rights of other states is
illegal according to the ICJ,57 while the Friendly Relations Declaration
imposes a duty upon countries “to refrain from organizing, instigating,
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another
State or acquiescing in . . . such acts . . . .” 58 If one country organizes,
actively supports, or contributes to the commission of one or more
terrorist offences through cyber-space, it can be said to be a state-sponsor of
cyberterrorism. 59 Some conventions (Convention for the Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism, and others) foresee individual criminal
responsibility for such acts, and although state leadership enjoys immunity,
it should still be possible to prosecute the responsible individuals after
they have stepped down from their posts (if the relevant conventions are
ratified in those states).
B. Non-State Actors
Non-state actors have been consistently viewed as groups capable of
perpetrating acts of terror and this status nowadays stems from the
international customary law. This is evidenced by a number of the UN
Security Council documents, 60 notably Resolutions 1526 (“Reiterating

56. See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec.
15, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-6 (1998). Cuba refers to “state terrorism” in its
respective reservations to the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings (1997). See id.
57. See Corfu Channel (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
58. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Principle 1, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).
59. Allen D. Walker, Applying International Law to the Cyber Attacks in Estonia
13 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished graduation requirement report) (on file with the Air
Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama).
60. See generally S.C. Res. 1989, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1989 (June 17, 2011); S.C.
Res. 1988, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1988 (June 17, 2011); S.C. Res. 1963, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1963
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its condemnation of the Al-Qaida network and other associated terrorist
groups for . . . criminal terrorist acts”), 1530 (“Condemns [. . .] the bomb
attacks in Madrid, Spain, perpetrated by the terrorist group ETA . . .”),
1963, and 1989 (“Expressing concern at the increase in incidents of
kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups . . . .”).
Currently there are over one hundred international terrorist organizations
ranging from small groups designated as such by a few states (Fianna
Éireann, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, People’s Mujahedin of Iran) to
groups widely recognized as terrorist organizations (Al-Qaeda, Lashkare-Taiba, Asbat al-Ansar). In the modern world, there are plenty of cyber
safe havens where these groups can operate without fear of direct reprisal.61
The success of counter-terrorist operations is likely to encourage these
non-state actors to turn to cyberterrorism62 and some groups, having lost
their physical sanctuary in key areas, have turned to the sanctuary of
cyberspace. 63
In 1999, the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey defined three levels of
organizations’ cyberterrorism capability:
1. Simple-Unstructured: The capability to conduct basic hacks
against individual systems using tools created by someone
else. The organization possesses little target analysis, command
and control, or learning capability.
2. Advanced-Structured: The capability to conduct more
sophisticated attacks against multiple systems or networks
and possibly, to modify or create basic hacking tools. The
organization possesses an elementary target analysis, command
and control, and learning capability.
3. Complex-Coordinated: The capability for coordinated attacks
capable of causing mass-disruption against integrated,
heterogeneous defenses (including cryptography). Ability to
create sophisticated hacking tools. Highly capable target
(Dec. 20, 2010); S.C. Res. 1904, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009); S.C. Res.
1822, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1822 (June 30, 2008); S.C. Res. 1735, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735
(Dec. 22, 2006); S.C. Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005); S.C. Res. 1530,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1530 (Mar. 11, 2004); S.C. Res. 1526, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan.
30, 2004); S.C. Res. 1455, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
61. See generally Kenneth Geers, Cyber Weapons Convention 26 COMPUTER L. &
SEC. REV. 547 (2010).
62. Gabriel Weimann, Cyberterrorism: How Real Is the Threat?, U.S. INST. OF
PEACE, Dec. 2004, at 1, 11.
63. Stuart H. Starr, Towards and Evolving Theory of Cyberpower, in THE VIRTUAL
BATTLEFIELD: PERSPECTIVES ON CYBER WARFARE, 18, 34 (Christian Czosseck & Kenneth
Geers eds., 2009).
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analysis, command and control, and organization learning
capability. 64
In 2002 evidence showed that Al-Qaeda considered a cyber-attack
against a dam, 65 and in 2005 the group planned to bring down the entire
internet traffic in the UK. 66 The Real IRA declared “the future lay in
cyberterrorism rather than car bombs” 67 and supporters of the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the past have spammed Sri Lankan embassies
with emails meant to disrupt their communications. 68 Though
cyberterrorism has not yet caused any casualties, these examples
demonstrate that existing terrorist groups are interested in inflicting
damage through cyber-space and in cyberterrorism per se. The low level
of their technical expertise (“simple-unstructured”) can be, and sometimes
is, compensated by recruiting technically-skilled individuals69 to improve
the terrorists’ capabilities in this regard. 70
Entire groups of cyber-criminals can work together and even merge
with known terrorist organizations if they share similar radical views,
religious or socio-political interests,71 in order to engage in cyberterrorism.
Alternatively, extremists can obtain knowledge and necessary programs
from hacker teams for a fee. Some groups like the “Russian Hacker
Association” have been offering one-time services over the Internet; 72

64. BILL NELSON, RODNEY CHOI, MICHAEL IACOBUCCI, MARK MITCHELL & GREG
GAGNON, CYBERTERROR: PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS, at IX (1999), cited with
approval in Dorothy E. Denning, Cyberterrorism: Testimony before the Special Oversight
Panel on Terrorism, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives,
GEORGETOWN UNIV. (May 23, 2000), http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/
cyberterror.html.
65. Shima D. Keene, Terrorism and the Internet: A Double-Edged Sword, 14 J.
MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 359, 364-65 (2011).
66. Id. at 363.
67. Simon Finch, Cyber-Terrorism is Real—Ask Estonia, TELEGRAPH (May 30, 2007,
12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3640255/Cyber-terrorismis-real-ask-Estonia.html.
68. Denning, supra note 64.
69. Andrew Rathmell, Cyber-Terrorism: The Shape of Future Conflict?, 6 J. FIN.
CRIME 277, 279 (1999).
70. STEPHEN J. LUKASIK & REBECCA GIVNER-FORBES, DETERRING THE USE OF
CYBER FORCE 46 (2009), available at http://www.learningace.com/doc/1347649/5e4bd5
e592d706f6019865a25bd59160/cyber_deterrencev2.
71. CLAY WILSON, BOTNETS, CYBERCRIME, AND CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES
AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 18 (2008).
72. NICK ELLSMORE, CYBER-TERRORISM IN AUSTRALIA: THE RISK TO BUSINESS AND
A PLAN TO PREPARE 7 (2002).
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information about computer vulnerabilities for which no software patch
(software designed to fix problems) exists yet can be obtained nowadays
on the black market for a sum of $1,000 to $5,000 USD. 73 Arrangements
with these groups for modifying existing programs or developing new ones
to target a particular object (nuclear reactor, airplane, etc.) are possible.74
Some individual cyber-criminal groups can have overlapping goals
with the “field-terrorists,” but they prefer to act independently, trying to
engage in “pure cyberterrorism.” For example, the “G-Force Pakistan”
group (sympathizers of Al-Qaeda) waged an independent cracking
campaign against the internet community (peaking in 2001–2002) with
the aim of liberating Kashmir, although its activities mostly consisted of
defacing websites 75 and not actual acts of cyberterrorism.
C. Corporations
Corporations have long been objects of cyber-attacks, 76 eventually
leading to their heavy investment in information technology (IT) security. 77
This, in turn, resulted in them having the most advanced cyber-defense
(and logically, cyber-offense) capabilities, which exceed those of many
states. In a world that moves away from “statecentrism,” 78 the knowhow, relative autonomy of operations, 79 significant funding and a structured
team of experts make corporations a potential perpetrator of cyberterrorist
acts. Though their cyber-attacks are likely to target competitors, 80
companies (especially multilateral corporations) may be interested in
destabilizing a country’s (or the entire world’s) economy for profit, or
they may be guided by the extremist views of their leadership.

73. WILSON, supra note 71.
74. David Peter Hansen, Is “Cybterterrorism” a Serious Threat to the Integrity of
Computer Networks? 29 (2010) (unpublished dissertation, University of Bradford),
available at http://files.dave.dk/cyberterrorism.pdf.
75. Namosha Veerasamy, Motivation for Cyberterrorism 3 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished
presentation, 9th Annual Information Security for South Africa) (on file with Council for
Scientific and Industrial Research Information Services, South Africa).
76. Gaurav Jain, Cyberterrorism: A Clear and Present Danger to Civilized
Society?, 3 INFO. SYS. EDUC. J. 3, 6 (2005), available at http://isedj.org/3/44/ISEDJ.
3(44).Jain.pdf.
77. Compare this to smaller enterprises, some of which, in the words of U.S.
adviser on cybersecurity Richard Clarke, “spend more on coffee than on cyber-security.”
See Robert Lemos, Security Guru: Let’s Secure the Net, ZDNET.COM (Feb. 19, 2002,
12:25 PST), http://www.zdnet.com/news/security-guru-lets-secure-the-net/120859.
78. TOBY BLYTH, CYBERTERRORISM AND PRIVATE CORPORATIONS: NEW THREAT
MODELS AND RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS 24 (1999).
79. Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of
Force, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 57, 104-05 (2001) (discussing information warfare
as a new type of weapon).
80. Id. at 105.
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Unlike terrorist organizations, corporations are often pressured to be
more transparent, 81 and to have a legal personality within their host state.
Though this does not preclude criminal behavior, this makes them a
special category of non-state actors (“any person”) that can be held legally
responsible for offenses criminalized by existing anti-terrorism conventions.
In other words, aside from the leadership of the corporation and members
of the IT team that was directly involved in cyberterrorism, it is possible to
prosecute the company itself, if the respective legal systems permit it.
D. Individuals
Finally, like the independent cyber-criminal groups, individual persons
may engage in acts of terrorism online, if motivated by money, prestige
or ideology. 82 These one-man cyberterrorists (so to say, “cyber-Breiviks”)
who have the knowledge necessary to conduct online attacks 83 work
alone, and, like their less sophisticated counterparts, can be divided into
categories revealing their motivations: psychopathic terrorists (individuals
who seek satisfaction in the need to control), religious and political
ethno-geographic terrorists (struggling for a “group-cause”), and retributional
terrorists (persons who suffered an atrocity against themselves, their
family, or community). 84 In addition, cyberterrorism includes other
categories of persons which are not typical to traditional extremism, such
as the greed-prompted (offering to wage cyberterrorism for a fee) or
“rebels” (who protest against the entire world order; this category includes
teenage cyber-criminals as well). 85

81. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switz., 2004,
Disclosure of the Impact of Corporations on Society: Current Trends and Issues,
UNCTAD/ITE/TEB/2003/7 (Aug. 26, 2004).
82. Suleyman Ozeren, Global Response to Cyberterrorism and Cybercrime: A
Matrix for International Cooperation and Vulnerability Assessment (Aug. 2005)
(dissertation prepared for philosophy doctorate, University of North Texas) (on file with
author).
83. Sean M. Condron, Getting it Right: Protecting American Critical
Infrastructure in Cyberspace, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 404, 404-06 (2007) (discussing the
growing threat of cyber attacks).
84. Raymond H. Hamden, The Retributional Terrorist: Type 4, in 2 THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM: CLINICAL ASPECTS AND RESPONSES 174 (Chris E. Stout ed.,
Greenwood 2002).
85. Arun Kr. Singh & Ahmad T. Siddiqui, New Face of Terror: Cyber Threats,
Emails Containing Viruses, 1 ASIAN J. TECH. & MGMT. RES. (2011) (discussing the new
face of terror).
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As mentioned previously, the existing treaty regime pertaining to
terrorism allows for the prosecution of individuals for terrorism (and
cyberterrorism as its sub-category). It should be noted though that states
may have an interest in avoiding prosecution of “talented” cyberterrorists, if
those cyberterrorists act in the interests of the state. Due to the lack of
cyber-experts, they can even be seen as limited state assets.86 Obviously
this approach would be a violation of a country’s legal obligations, and
could possibly be seen as state-sponsorship of cyberterrorism.
III. TARGETS AND AIMS
A. Reasons for Cyberterrorism
Extremists have a lot of secondary reasons to resort to cyberterrorism:
it helps weaken “enemy’s” operational capabilities; destroys the reputation
of an organization, nation, or alliance; demonstrates that terrorists groups
are capable of inflicting significant harm on their targets; and even
persuades those attacked to change affiliation.87 However, the main purpose
remains to inflict damage on the selected targets and maximize the
harmful consequences.
Targets which might be susceptible to cyberterrorism include, but are
not limited to: air-traffic controls and navigation computers on board of
commercial planes and ships, atomic power plants, and nuclear-material
enrichment facilities. Conventional attacks against these targets by nonstate actors are already outright criminalized by the existing counterterrorism agreements and their protocols. Other vulnerable targets comprise
power substations, water supply networks and automated food preparation
factories, “smart” transportation grids, banks and stock-exchanges, dams,
computerized cars, gas and oil pipelines, space-navigation controls, medical
institutions, and implanted medical devices. Cyber-strikes against these
targets may result in terrorism-like effects and contribute to the creation
of restlessness and mob-mentality among the general population.
Some analysts note that acts of cyberterrorism against these targets are
less favorable for terrorist organizations, since they would result in less
immediate drama and have a lower psychological impact than a
conventional attack. 88 Indeed, a carefully-planned physical act of terror
86. JEFFREY CARR, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE 29 (2009).
87. Shamsuddin Abdul Jalil, Counting Cyber Terrorism Effectively: Are We
Ready to Rumble? (June 2003) (practical assignment for GIAC security essentials
certification) (on file with SANS Institute and author); see also Rajeev C. Puran, Beyond
Conventional Terrorism. . . The Cyber Assault (Feb. 2003) (practical assignment for
GIAC security essentials certification) (on file with SANS Institute and author).
88. CLAY WILSON, COMPUTER ATTACK AND CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES
AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 18-19 (2005).
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can have a tremendous effect on population’s feeling of security, 89 as
evidenced by the Nord-Ost hostage crisis in Moscow (2002), Madrid
bombings (2004), London bombings (2005) and other terrorist attacks.
However, unlike traditional terrorism, cyberterrorism does not require
substantial financial investments or physical presence to be successful.
In fact, the only real prerequisite to carry out an act of cyberterrorism is
technical knowledge—once acquired, a free and reusable asset. 90 This
makes cyberterrorist attacks a much more convenient option, and thus,
very probable in some situations where distance and financial matters
may otherwise pose a problem for the extremists.
While the current international treaty regime pertaining to terrorism
does not directly mention cyber-attacks, and the majority of the existing
conventions were created when cyber-strikes were unimaginable, this
does not exclude their application to the acts of cyberterrorism. In
addition, the principles enshrined in them help influence the formation
of international customary law 91 in relation to these acts.
In the context of cyberterrorism, it is important to distinguish between
the real risks and low-probability scenarios, which are close to fiction.
For the purposes of this Article, the legal instruments shall be analyzed in
the order of increasing possibility of committing terrorist acts, criminalized
therein, through cyber-space: from impossible to highly probable.
B. Manufacturing Explosives
The crime of manufacturing unmarked explosives, prohibited by
Article 2 of the 1991 Plastic Explosives Convention, 92 cannot be perpetrated
through cyber-space even in theory. Even if computers in official
facilities are in some manner engaged in the preparation process, and a
program malfunction can result in a wrong marking being put on the
materials, the explosives are thoroughly checked by humans before they
89. Patrick S. Tibbetts, Terrorist Use of the Internet and Related Information
Technologies: A Monograph, U.S. ARMY (2002), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?
AD=ADA403802.
90. See generally Sarah Gordon & Richard Ford, Cyberterrorism?, SYMANTEC
(2003), https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/cyberterrorism.pdf.
91. Matthew J. Skleroy, Solving the Dilemma of State Response to Cyberattacks: A
Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Negelect Their Duty to
Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 64-65 (2009) (discussing the common principles of opinio
juris when cyberattacks are used as a terrorist weapon).
92. ICAO, 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose
of Detection, June 21, 1988, ICAO Doc. S/22393, 30 I.L.M. 721.
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are released for sale or use. Moreover, in this case the manufacturing
process would not be done by the same persons who are carrying out the
cyber-attacks, ruling out criminal responsibility due to the lack of mens
rea.
C. Bombings
The 1997 Terrorist Bombing Convention prohibits 93 another crime
that is impossible to commit through cyber-space: unlawfully and
intentionally delivering, placing, discharging, or detonating “an explosive or
other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a State or
government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure
facility.” Article 1(3) of the same convention clarifies that “explosive or
other lethal device” means a) an explosive or incendiary weapon or
device that is designed, or has the capability, to cause death, serious
bodily injury or substantial material damage; or b) a weapon or device
that is designed, or has the capability, to cause death, serious bodily
injury or substantial material damage through the release, dissemination
or impact of toxic chemicals, biological agents or toxins or similar
substances or radiation or radioactive material. “Delivering” and “placing”
of these weapons or devices is a physical act that cannot be done through
cyber-space; they are also rarely armed before being “delivered” by a
legitimate agent (allowing discharge and detonation), and seldom detonated
through electronic means (chemical, mechanical, or electrical triggers
are used instead).
Looking back at the cyber-attack on the Trans-Siberian natural gas
pipeline in 1982, one should consider a more inclusive interpretation of
the word “device” in the Convention. The 1982 incident, indeed, proves
that a cyber-attack against a non-military device that is part of the oil
and gas energy infrastructure can result in an explosion. However, what
is being “detonated” and “discharged” in such case is the gas or petrol.
Therefore, according to grammatical interpretation of law, the exploited
device itself does not have the capacity to explode, since explosive
materials are not part of it.
93. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, art. 2(1),
Dec. 15, 1997, http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-9.pdf (“Any person
commits an offense within the meaning of this Convention if that person unlawfully and
intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal device
in, into or against a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public
transportation system or an infrastructure facility:
a. With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
b. With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or
system, where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major
economic loss.”).
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Aviv Cohen notes 94 that computers at nuclear reactors and biological
labs may fall under the definition of Article 1(3)(b) (a device that has the
capacity to cause death, injury and damage through the release of toxins
or radiation), since they control the levels of “temperature, moisture,
radiation and other data that is crucial to safety” and as such, upon a
cyberterrorist act, can cause a disaster. Cohen further argues 95 that this is
supported by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, according to which the Terrorist Bombing Convention should
be interpreted in light of its purpose. What Cohen fails to note, however,
is that the same Article 31(1) states that the “terms of the treaty” must be
given “ordinary meaning”, moreover, taking into account the year when
the Terrorist Bombing Convention was created (i.e. “circumstances of its
conclusion,” in accordance with the Article 32(a) of the Vienna
Convention 96), its purpose and objective could not have been anything else
but to prevent traditional bombings and not cyberterrorism. Consequently,
cyberterrorists cannot violate the Terrorist Bombing Convention.
D. Hostages
The 1979 Hostages Convention calls for97 appropriate penalties against
“any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to
continue to detain another person . . . in order to compel a third party . . . to
do or abstain from doing any acts as an explicit or implicit condition for
the release of the hostage . . . .” Nowadays, the possibility of holding
persons hostage through “pure” cyber-attacks is close to impossible. The
terrorists, with some luck, may be able to capture someone in a confined
high-tech contraption, such as an elevator or a computerized car, but the
prospect of injuring or continuing to detain him or her is very unlikely—
modern cable-borne, hydraulic, and other elevators are employing
mechanical devices (including brakes), nullifying any physical danger
from cyber-attacks. At the same time, vehicle windows can be broken
and elevator doors can be opened manually when the rescue arrives,
excluding the possibility of continuous detention.
94. Aviv Cohen, Cyberterrorism: Are We Legally Ready?, 9 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 1,
27-28 (2010) (discussing international responses to terrorism).
95. Id. at 28.
96. See also SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (2001).
97. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, art. 1(1) & 2, Dec.
17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 207.
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E. Financing Terrorism
Providing and collecting funds in order to carry out a terrorist act 98
under the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention hardly fits the notion of
cyberterrorist offense: generally, “providing” implies money or other
assets are already in possession of the perpetrator, while storing and
maintaining them does not require a cyber-attack. At the same time it
should be noted that breaking into someone’s financial online accounts
by means of cyber-attack for the purposes of transferring money to
terrorists or acquiring them for further use by extremist organizations
would satisfy the narrow overlapping legal requirements to be considered
both cyber-strike and an offense under the Terrorist Financing
Convention.
F. Protected Persons
The 1973 Diplomatic Agents Convention criminalizes 99 the
intentional commission of “a murder, kidnapping or other attack upon
the person or liberty of an internationally protected person” or “a violent
attack upon the official premises, the private accommodation or the means
of transport of an internationally protected person likely to endanger his
person or liberty.” “Murder” or injuring (“other attack upon the person”)
is the prohibited conduct which does not depend on the means
employed. It can take the form of crashing a protected person’s
transport, tempering with a hospital computer, infecting his
implanted medical device, a computer-triggered explosion, or a similar
harmful act. A list of diplomatic agents and information about their cyber-

98. International Convention for the Suppressing of the Financing of Terrorism,
art. 2(1), G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess. Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc A/54/49 (Vol.
I) (Dec. 9, 1999) (“Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this
Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully,
provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge
that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out:
a. An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in
one of the treaties listed in the annex; or
b. Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian,
or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a
situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”).
99. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, art. 2(1), Dec. 14, 1973,
1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
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implants, cars, etc. can be provided over the Internet, 100 and a bounty may
encourage persons from all over the world to engage in such attacks.
Because injuries have to be a direct consequence of a cyber-strike to
be “intentional,” acts such as general food or water poisoning through
cyber-means do not fall under those prohibited by the present Convention.
The same principle applies to cyber-attacks against the premises,
accommodation, or means of transport—they have to be direct and
threaten the life of the protected person to constitute cyberterrorism.
Kidnapping of state officials and their family members 101 is ruled out for
the same reasons as ordinary hostage taking (see above), although trapping
protected persons in a computerized car or elevator would constitute an
“other attack upon liberty.”
G. Maritime Vessels
Current technology does not permit taking full control over a ship 102
through cyber-attacks. 103 As mentioned above, “placing” a device or
substance is a physical act; and even if a cyber-saboteur onboard a ship
uses an infected USB flash-drive, it is not the USB device that would
endanger the safe navigation, but the program itself—a virtual object,
not substance (physical matter). Breach of Article 3(1)(d) 104 therefore, is
also impossible.
Injuring or killing a person with intent to carry out a terrorist attack
onboard a ship (prohibited by Article 3(1)(g) 105) can theoretically be
done by tempering with an electronic medical implant, yet it is not

100. Steve Saint-Claire, Overview and Analysis on Cyber Terrorism, 3 SCH. DOCTORAL
STUD. EUR. UNION J. 85, 89 (2011).
101. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, supra note 100, at art.
1(1)(a) (describing protected persons).
102. See id. at art. 1(1)(a) (explaining that warships, naval auxiliary ships, vessels of
customs or police authorities and ships withdrawn from navigation are not covered by
the Maritime Convention).
103. This does not include violations of the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, art. 3(1)(a), Mar. 10, 1988,
1678 U.N.T.S. 224, which reads: “Any person commits an offense if that person
unlawfully and intentionally: (a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat
thereof or any other form of intimidation.”
104. See id. at art. 3(1)(d).
105. See id. at art. 3(1)(g), which reads: “injures or kills any person, in connection
with the commission or the attempted commission of any of the offenses set forth in
subparagraphs (a) to (f).”
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necessary at all to conduct other cyber-attacks. “An act of violence
against a person onboard a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe
navigation” (Article 3(1)(b) 106) would have to be targeted against all
persons with crucial knowledge, or in a manner that would devastate a
significant part of the ship required for safe navigation, in order to be
considered terrorism under the present Convention—an almost impossible
prospect. This also applies to an improbable possibility of damaging the
ship or its cargo through cyber-attacks, prohibited by Article 3(1)(c). 107
Seriously damaging and interfering with the operation of navigational
facilities (illegal under Article 3(1)(e) 108) and communicating false
information to endanger the safety of a ship (criminalized by Article
3(1)(f) 109) through cyber-strikes, on the other hand, are highly probable
in cases where the ship is new and it heavily relies on computer technology
for navigation.
Article 3bis(1), added to the Maritime Convention by the 2005 Protocol,
sets out a list of additional terrorist offenses involving a ship. Although
sub-paragraph 3bis(1)(b) (and Article 3ter as a whole) can be disregarded,
since virtual attacks cannot result in “transporting on board a ship” of
various dangerous materials, WMDs (or persons), sub-paragraph (1)(a)
of Article 3bis merits a closer attention. It reads:
Any person commits an offence . . . if that person unlawfully and intentionally . . . ,
when the purpose of the act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or
to abstain from doing any act:
(i)
uses against or on a ship or discharges from a ship any explosive,
radioactive material or BCN weapon in a manner that causes or is
likely to cause death or serious injury or damage; or
(ii) discharges, from a ship, oil, liquefied natural gas, or other hazardous or
noxious substance, . . . in such quantity or concentration that causes or
is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage; or
(iii) uses a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or
damage. 110

Although this provision specifies the necessary terrorist intent, actus
reus is unlikely. The first two sub-paragraphs of 3bis(1)(a) quoted above

106. See id. at art. 3(1)(b), which reads: “performs an act of violence against a
person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship.”
107. See id. at art. 3(1)(c), which reads: “destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship
or to its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship.”
108. See id. at art. 3(1)(e), which reads: “destroys or seriously damages maritime
navigational facilities or seriously interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely
to endanger the safe navigation of a ship.”
109. See id. at art. 3(1)(f), which reads: “communicates information which he
knows to be false, thereby endangering the safe navigation of a ship.”
110. Id. which reads: “(iv) threatens, with or without a condition, as is provided for
under national law, to commit an offence set forth in subparagraph (a)(i), (ii) or (iii).”
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criminalize acts that, in theory, could be perpetrated through cyber-attacks,
if the hazardous materials are present onboard a ship and they can somehow
be destabilized through an electronic network. In reality, however, this is
almost impossible since there is no good reason to connect such materials to
a complicated computer network.
Breaching sub-paragraph 3bis(1)(a)(iii) is even more unlikely, since,
as mentioned previously, no technology exists that would allow a ship to
be navigated remotely. Even if it did, cyberterrorists’ plans to use the
ship for causing death and destruction could be hampered with a simple
anchor.
H. Fixed Platforms
Article 2(1) 111 of the 1988 Protocol to the Maritime Convention
applies the principles, formulated in Article 3(1) of the latter, to the fixed
platforms. For the same reasons as in the case of ships, seizing and
controlling a platform (Article 2(1)(a)) and placing a device or substance
that can destroy it (Article 2(1)(d)) are ruled out in the context of
cyberterrorism. Cyber-violence against a person (Article 2(1)(b)) would
have to be carried out in an unlikely wide-spread manner that endangered
the safety of the entire fixed platform (Article 2(1)(c)). Though injuring
a person in connection with these offenses (Article 2(1)(e)) would also
be possible by attacking his or her medical implant, due to the unlikelihood
of the offenses in sub-paragraphs (a)-(d) of Article 2(1), this can only be
part of a hybrid terrorist attack and not a case of “pure” cyberterrorism.
The offenses in Article 2bis 112 of the 2005 Protocol to the Fixed
Platforms Protocol are very similar to those in Article 3bis(1)(a) of the

111. See Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, art. 2(1), Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304,
27 I.L.M. 685 [hereinafter Platforms Protocol], which reads:
Any person commits an offense if that person unlawfully and intentionally: (a)
seizes or exercises control over a fixed platform by force or threat thereof or
any other form of intimidation; or (b) performs an act of violence against a
person on board a fixed platform if that act is likely to endanger its safety; or
(c) destroys a fixed platform or causes damage to it which is likely to endanger
its safety; or (d) places or causes to be placed on a fixed platform, by any
means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that fixed
platform or likely to endanger its safety; (e) injures or kills any person in
connection with the commission or the attempted commission of any of the
offenses set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (d).
112. See id. at art. 2bis, which reads:
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Maritime Convention. For the same reasons, since dangerous materials
and WMDs are not usually connected to conventional computers, a
breach of Article 3bis(1)(a) of the Maritime Convention is impossible in
reality. In addition, if presence of radioactive or other hazardous materials
onboard vessels can be explained by necessity of transportation, there is
little reason to keep them on fixed platforms.
I. Nuclear Terrorism
Since nuclear material is a physical entity, out of the acts criminalized
by Article 7(1) 113 of the 1980 Nuclear Materials Convention, receipt,
possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal (Article 7(1)(a)), theft, robbery
(Article 7(1)(b)), embezzlement, and fraudulent obtaining (Article
7(1)(c)), carrying, sending, or moving (Article 7(1)(d), as amended in
2005 114) of nuclear material are unlikely in the context of
cyberterrorism, though not impossible. 115 A demand for nuclear material
by use of cyber-force (Article 7(1)(d)) would constitute a hybrid terrorist
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Protocol if that
person unlawfully and intentionally, when the purpose of the act, by its nature
or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act:
(a) uses against or on a fixed platform or discharges from a fixed
platform any explosive, radioactive material or BCN weapon in a
manner that causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or
damage; or
(b) discharges, from a fixed platform, oil, liquefied natural gas, or other
hazardous or noxious substance, which is not covered by subparagraph
(a), in such quantity or concentration that causes or is likely to cause
death or serious injury or damage; or
(c) threatens, with or without a condition, as is provided for under national
law, to commit an offence set forth in subparagraph (a) or (b).
113. See The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, art. 7(1),
Mar. 3, 1980, 1456 U.N.T.S. 125 [hereinafter Nuclear Materials Convention], which
reads:
The intentional commission of:
(a) An act without lawful authority which constitutes the receipt,
possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear
material and which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury
to any person or substantial damage to property;
(b) A theft or robbery of nuclear material;
(c) An embezzlement or fraudulent obtaining of nuclear material;
(d) An act constituting a demand for nuclear material by threat or use of
force or by any other form of intimidation; . . . shall be made
punishable offense . . . .
114. See Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, art. 7(1)(d), Nov. 18, 2010, S. Treaty Doc. No. 110-6, which reads: “an act
which constitutes the carrying, sending, or moving of nuclear material into or out of a
State without lawful authority.”
115. Consider if the US B-52H bomber, that was mistakenly transferring nuclear
warheads in 2007, was connected to the internet and hijacked by cyberterrorists.
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act. The most probable relevant terrorist act in relation to nuclear
material that can be done purely via cyber-space, therefore, is its
“dispersal”, which is likely to cause death or serious injury or substantial
damage to property (Article 7(1)(a)) or the environment (as amended),
or as specified in the amended Article 7(1)(e), “an act directed against a
nuclear facility, 116 or an act interfering with the operation of a nuclear
facility, where the offender causes, or . . . knows that the act is likely to
cause, death or . . . injury . . . or substantial damage to property or to the
environment . . . .”
Contemporary nuclear reactors run on uranium-235 or plutonium-239
fissile—matter that falls under the definition of “nuclear material” in
Article 1(a) 117 of the Nuclear Materials Convention. The Slammer’s
intrusion into the Ohio nuclear power plant in 2003 and the Stuxnet
attacks in 2009–2010 prove that it is indeed possible to damage nuclear
facilities with cyber-attacks. These two particular incidents inflicted
minor damage and did not cause any “substantial” damage or injury, nor
were likely to cause it (despite the unpredictable behavior or infected
hardware), and therefore fell short of being criminalized by the present
Convention. Nevertheless, attempts to cause destruction through cyberspace continue, 118 and the possibility of substantial damage in the future
should not be ruled out.
As in the case of Nuclear Materials Convention, certain physical acts
under Article 2(1) 119 of the 2005 Nuclear Terrorism Convention, such as
116. “‘[N]uclear facility’ means a facility (including associated buildings and
equipment) in which nuclear material is produced, processed, used, handled, stored or
disposed of, if damage to or interference with such facility could lead to the release of
significant amounts of radiation or radioactive material.” Id. at art. 1(d).
117. “‘[N]uclear material’ means plutonium except that with isotopic concentration
exceeding 80% in plutonium-238; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or
233; uranium containing the mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature other than in the
form of ore or ore-residue; any material containing one or more of the foregoing.”
Nuclear Materials Convention, supra note 114, at art. 1(a).
118. Michael L. Hummel, Internet Terrorism, 2 HOMELAND SECURITY REV. 117,
121 (2008).
119. See International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,
art. 2(1), Apr. 13, 2005, 2445 U.N.T.S. 89, 44 I.L.M. 815 [hereinafter Nuclear Terrorism
Convention], which reads:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that
person unlawfully and intentionally:
(a) Possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses a device:
(i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the
environment;
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possessing radioactive material,120 making or possessing a nuclear device 121
(Article 2(1)(a)), or using a nuclear device (Article 2(1)(b)) are excluded
from the framework of cyberterrorism. The present instrument, however,
also prohibits damaging (or using) a nuclear facility 122 in a manner
which releases or risks the release of radioactive material (Article 2(1)(b)).
Unlike the amended Article 7(1)(e) of the Nuclear Terrorism
Convention, aside from being committed with the intent to cause death,
injury, or damage, the crime becomes a terrorist act also in the case
when the perpetrator(s) intend to compel a natural or legal person, an
international organization, or a state to do or refrain from doing any act
(Article 2(1)(b)(iii)).
Despite the minor damage that Stuxnet caused, the destruction of
centrifuges did risk the release of radioactive material (even if it was in
small quantities) and one of its goals seems to have been to make the
Islamic Republic of Iran abandon its nuclear program. Therefore, the use
of Stuxnet against Iranian nuclear facilities was in breach of the
obligations set by the Nuclear Terrorism Convention and, in essence, is
the first act of nuclear cyberterrorism in history. Nevertheless, from a
legal perspective, this holds true only on a customary level, since neither
Iran nor the potential “suspects”—Israel and USA—had signed the Nuclear
Terrorism Convention by 2011, absolving them from any criminal
responsibility.
J. Aircrafts
Cyberterrorism in the context of offenses against aircrafts do not
require presence of a person onboard during flight. Cyber-attacks against

(b

Uses in any way radioactive material or a device, or uses or damages
a nuclear facility in a manner which releases or risks the release of
radioactive material:
(i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the
environment; or
(iii) With the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an
international organization or a State to do or refrain from doing
an act.
120. Id. at art. 1(2).
121. Id. at art. 1(4) (defining “device” as “(a) Any nuclear explosive device; or (b)
Any radioactive material dispersal or radiation-emitting device which may, owing to its
radiological properties, cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial damage to
property or to the environment”).
122. Id. at art. 1(3) (defining “Nuclear facility” as “(a) Any nuclear reactor, including
reactors installed on vessels, vehicles, aircraft or space objects for use as an energy
source in order to propel such vessels, vehicles, aircraft or space objects or for any other
purpose; (b) Any plant or conveyance being used for the production, storage, processing,
or transport of radioactive material”).
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planes are much more likely to occur through electronic networks (or at
least by installing harmful programs before flight), since a person who
makes his way to the cockpit can crash a plane much faster manually
without any programs, and because the wireless devices nowadays are
not capable of taking control over a conventional (manned) aircraft. In
addition, there is a risk that suspicious devices onboard that will inevitably
cause interference will be noticed, confiscated or destroyed by the crew.
These factors exclude the applicability to cyber-attacks of the nonamended version of the 1970 Unlawful Seizure Convention123 as a whole,
although Article 6(1) of the 1963 Aviation Convention still allows the
aircraft commander to impose reasonable measures upon persons who
are suspected of jeopardizing safety onboard the plane (e.g., those trying
to commit a cyber-attack).
On the other hand, Article 1(1) 124 of the Unlawful Seizure
Convention, included in its 2010 Protocol, does not require presence of a
person inside an aircraft, and criminalizes seizure of an aircraft “by
any technical means” (including cyber-attacks). The 2010 Protocol also
replaces reference to an aircraft “in flight” in Articles 1 and 3 with an
“aircraft in service” 125 (lasting from aircraft preparation to twenty-four
hours after landing). As mentioned before, no cyber-attack can establish
effective control over a manned aircraft. However, under the amended
text of the Convention it is possible to commit an act of cyberterrorism
by seizing control over unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Aircrafts such
as remote piloted drones that are used for various purposes in more than
fifty countries 126 can be “hijacked” by infecting their control stations

123. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, supra note
26, at art 1 (criminalizing the act of seizing and exercising control over an aircraft).
124. See Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, supra note 26, at art. II, which reads: “Any person
commits an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally seizes or exercises control
of an aircraft in service by force or threat thereof, or by coercion, or by any other form of
intimidation, or by any technological means.”
125. Article 3(1) of the Amended Unlawful Seizure Convention reads: “For the
purposes of this Convention, an aircraft is considered to be in service from the beginning
of the pre-flight preparation of the aircraft by ground personnel or by the crew for a
specific flight until twenty-four hours after any landing. In the case of a forced landing,
the flight shall be deemed to continue until the competent authorities take over the
responsibility for the aircraft and for persons and property on board.” Id. at art. V.
126. These countries include the USA, Russia, China, France, Germany, Georgia,
India, Israel, Pakistan, Egypt, and others. See Jack M. Beard, Law and War in the Virtual
Era, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 409, 444 (2009).
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and, actually, these stations have been subject to cyber-attacks before. 127
Since Article 3(2) excludes applicability of the Unlawful Seizure
Convention to military, customs, and police aircraft, cyberterrorism
under the present instrument is possible only when unlawfully exercising
control over commercial, civilian, and scientific UAVs.
Placing or causing a device or substance to be placed on board,
criminalized by Article 1(1)(c) 128 of the 1971 Civil Aviation Convention,
is impossible through cyber-space. As in the case of Maritime Convention,
performing an act of cyber-violence against a person on board an aircraft
in service, in a manner that endangers the plane’s safety (Article
1(1)(a) 129) would have to target a key person (e.g., a pilot). Constant
movement of the airplane at high altitudes will prevent a cyber-attack
against this person’s medical implant (the only possibility in this case)
from the ground, leaving only the option of sneak “attack” from one of
the passengers. However, the chances of both pilots having computerized
implants and both cyber-strikes from within the aircraft being successful
are close to zero.
Violence against a particular individual can also take the form of
destroying or causing significant damage to an entire plane (Article
1(1)(b)130). In the context of cybeterrorism, such damage can occur as a
result of a technical malfunction triggered by a cyber-attack (e.g.,
detonation of the aircraft’s fuel) or upon impact with the ground, due to
cyber-interference with the operation of navigational facilities (Article
1(1)(d) 131) or communicating wrong information to the pilots, air traffic
control (in case of a manned plane), or to the UAV control stations
(Article 1(1)(e) 132).

127. See supra Parts 1.1–1.3; see also Noah Shachtman, Computer Virus Hits US
Predator and Reaper Drone Fleet, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 7, 2011), http://arstechnica.
com/business/news/2011/10/exclusive-computer-virus-hits-drone-fleet.ars.
128. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, supra note 2, at art. 1(1)(c), which reads: “Any person commits an
offence if he unlawfully and intentionally . . . [p]laces or causes to be placed on an
aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to
destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which renders it incapable of flight, or to
cause damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight.”
129. Id. at art 1(1)(a), which reads: “performs an act of violence against a person on
board an aircraft in flight if that act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft.”
130. Id. at art. 1(1)(b), which reads: “destroys an aircraft in service or causes
damage to such an aircraft which renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to
endanger its safety in flight.”
131. Id. at art. 1(1)(d), which reads: “destroys or damages air navigation facilities or
interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft
in flight.”
132. Id. at art. 1(1)(e), which reads: “communicates information which he knows to
be false, thereby endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight.”
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The 1988 Airport Protocol to the Civil Aviation Convention adds two
additional offenses: use of a device to perform an “act of violence against a
person at an airport serving international civil aviation . . . likely to cause
serious injury or death” (Article 1(1bis)(a)133) and damaging the facilities of
an airport or immobile aircraft or disrupting airport’s services (Article
1(1bis)(b) 134), if they endanger or are likely to endanger safety at that
airport. An act of violence in this case can take the form of a cyberattack against a medical implant, means of transportation, or any other
computerized systems within the airport, endangering both the health of
the targeted individuals and, if the targeted individuals are working at
the flight control facilities, the lives of the passengers on incoming and
outgoing flights.
Though the prospect of cyberterrorists damaging the airport or stationary
aircrafts is unlikely, disrupting its services is very probable, since basically
any interference with the standard operation of the computer systems at
the airport, 135 especially those of the air traffic control, could constitute
such an offense.
Prohibitions contained in the Civil Aviation Convention’s Articles
1(1) and 1(1bis) were entirely incorporated into Article 1 of the 2010
New Civil Aviation Convention. Moreover, according to the UN Action
to Counter-Terrorism’s website, “[a] cyber-attack on air navigation
facilities constitutes an attack.” 136 Among the new offenses added by
this Convention, transporting (Article 1(1)(i)137) and using (Article
133. See id. at art. 1(1bis(a)), which reads: “performs an act of violence against a
person at an airport serving international civil aviation which causes or is likely to cause
serious injury or death.”
134. Id., which reads: “destroys or seriously damages the facilities of an airport
serving international civil aviation or aircraft not in service located thereon or disrupts
the services of the airport.”
135. Cohen, supra note 94, at 23.
136. International Legal Instruments to Counter Terrorism, U.N. ACTION TO
COUNTER TERRORISM, http://www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml (last visited Oct.
28, 2012).
137. Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International
Civil Aviation, supra note 2, art. 1(1)(i) (“Any person commits an offence if that person
unlawfully and intentionally . . . transports, causes to be transported, or facilitates the
transport of, on board an aircraft: (1) any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that
it is intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause, with or without a condition, as is
provided for under national law, death or serious injury or damage for the purpose of
intimidating a population, or compelling a government or an international organization to
do or to abstain from doing any act; or (2) any BCN weapon, knowing it to be a BCN
weapon as defined in Article 2; or (3) any source material, special fissionable material,
or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or
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1(1)(h)138) dangerous materials and WMDs on board a plane—physical
actions—are not relevant in the case of cyberterrorism. Releasing and
discharging such hazardous substances (Article 1(1)(g) 139) through
cyber-means are impossible since, as mentioned previously, connecting
these materials to electronic networks is illogical and unlikely. However,
since civilian UAVs can be seized and controlled by cyberterrorists (see
above), they can also use them for “causing death, serious bodily injury
or serious damage to property or the environment” on the ground, in
breach of Article 1(1)(f) 140 of the New Civil Aviation Convention.
K. Conventional Terrorism in Cyber-Space: Summary
To summarize, a table that reflects the applicability of relevant antiterrorism instruments in the context of potential cyberterrorism is
presented on the next page.
L. Other Targets
Now that the anti-terrorist conventions are thoroughly analyzed, one
should consider whether some crimes remain outside the scope of the
treaty regime, but can still be considered acts of cyberterrorism under the
customary international law.
Human bodies are not directly connected to computers in any way,
therefore the majority of cyberterrorist acts (with the exception of those,
which result in humans following wrong data, due to a cyber-attack),
will chronologically result in property damage (and economic loss) before
injury to a person (if any). Growing reliance on technology in the
developed countries, coinciding with vulnerability of computer networks,
has led to a situation where cyber-criminals can choose between various
entities that are susceptible to cyber-attacks—from banking and financial
production of special fissionable material, knowing that it is intended to be used in a
nuclear explosive activity or in any other nuclear activity not under safeguards pursuant
to a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency; or (4) any
equipment, materials or software or related technology that significantly contributes to
the design, manufacture or delivery of a BCN weapon without lawful authorization and
with the intention that it will be used for such purpose.”).
138. Id. at art. 1(1)(h) (“uses against or on board an aircraft in service any BCN
weapon or explosive, radioactive, or similar substances in a manner that causes or is
likely to cause death, serious bodily injury or serious damage to property or the
environment”).
139. Id. at art. 1(1)(g) (“releases or discharges from an aircraft in service any BCN
weapon or explosive, radioactive, or similar substances in a manner that causes or is
likely to cause death, serious bodily injury or serious damage to property or the
environment”).
140. Id. at art. 1(1)(f) (“uses an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death,
serious bodily injury, or serious damage to property or the environment”).
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institutions to military defense systems. 141 However, not all of these
attacks would fall under the definition contained in the Draft
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, which, as
mentioned before, represents a consensus between states, and as such, to
a certain degree, reflects customary law. For example, Vitek Boden,
while dumping raw sewage during his cyber-attack in 2000 and causing
damage to property and environment, 142 was guided by individual
motives, 143 and did not desire to “intimidate a population or compel a
Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from
doing any act,” nor did such intent arise from the context of his crime;
therefore, his act cannot be characterized as cyberterrorism.
Though the definition in the Draft Convention uses terms which are
very subjective, such as “serious damage to public or private property”
and “major economic loss,” it is possible to draw a list of objects
susceptible to cyber-attacks, which might be relevant in this case.
“Purpose” to compel a government to do or abstain from doing something
arises entirely from the circumstances of each individual situation.
Considerations include whether this is the first terrorist offense of the
person or terrorist group, whether there have been any demands, whether
the situation involves a political background, and so on. Therefore, one
should concentrate on the intent to intimidate a population, which is
likely to stem from the nature and context of the criminal act itself.144
Due to their virtual nature, and since cyber-attacks more often fail
than succeed, they cannot be expected to inflict significant damage to
different private properties in a manner that would terrorize ordinary
citizens. Therefore, when talking about property and economic loss, the
population can be expected to only fear cyber-attacks against objects that
are essential for the functioning of the economy and society as a whole
(i.e. critical infrastructure). One can conclude from this that cyber-strikes
that are likely to seriously damage vital computer facilities responsible
for agriculture and food, water, public health, emergency services,
government, telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and

141. Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Cyber Terrorism and Aviation—National and International
Responses, 4 J. TRANSP. SECURITY 337, 340 (2011).
142. Alexandre Kiss, The International Protection Enviornment, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 391 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl ed.,
1998).
143. Susan W. Brenner, Cybercrime, Cyberterrorism and Cyberwarfare, 77 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL [R.I.D.P.] 453, 458 (2006).
144. Carlos A. Rodriguez, Cyberterrorism: A Rising Threat in the Western Hemisphere
(Apr. 2006) (unpublished thesis, Inter-American Defense College), available at http://library.
jid.org/en/mono45/Rodriguez,%20Carlos.pdf.

172

SHIRYAEV PAGES EDIT (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

10/24/2016 4:56 PM

Cyberterrorism

[VOL. 14: 139, 2012]

SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

finance, chemical industry and hazardous materials, postage and shipping,145
police, heating (where applicable), and military (depending on the outcome
of the definition controversy) should be considered acts of terrorism (and
therefore cyberterrorism) under existing customary international law.
Finally, it seems obvious that “death or serious bodily injury” scares an
ordinary person regardless of the means employed by terrorists, especially
if victims are random. Therefore, aside from the acts criminalized by the
existing legal instruments, life-threatening cyber-attacks against dams,
water supply networks, automated food preparation factories, ground
transport controls, computerized cars, space-navigation controls, medical
institutions, medical implants, chemical laboratories, and other facilities
should also be considered acts of cyberterrorism under customary norms.
Although not unequivocally globally criminalized, such acts of
cyberterrorism, like other acts of terror, 146 can be prosecuted as crimes
against humanity 147—if they are widespread or systematic and satisfy
other necessary criteria.
These conclusions demonstrate that the danger of cyberterrorism in
peace-time is adequately covered by international law. Now it is essential to
review the legal framework surrounding response to this threat to
determine whether such acts constitute an “armed attack” and whether
states can respond to it with armed force.
IV. CYBERTERRORISM AND JUS AD BELLUM
A. Self-Defense Against Terrorism
Governments today are aware of the vulnerabilities of the domestic
infrastructures and of the potential threat that cyberterrorism represents. 148
However, while new ways to conduct cyber-attacks are being shared

145. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE,
HANDBOOK NO. 1.02, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE THREATS AND TERRORISM § 4 (2006).
146. Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After 11
September, 16 INT’L REL. 155, 164 (2002).
147. See Michael P. Scharf & Michael A. Newton, Terrorism and Crimes Against
Humanity, in FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 262, 267-69
(Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2011); see also Roberta Arnold, Terrorism As a Crime Against
Humanity Under the ICC Statute, in INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN COUNTERTERRORISM: THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST
TERRORISM 121, 135 (Giuseppe Nesi ed., 2006).
148. William Gravell, Some Observations Along the Road to “National Information
Power”, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 401, 408 (1999).
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between crackers around the world, 149 the inter-state cooperation is lagging
behind. For example, when the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation
Task Force (CTITF) Working Group on Countering the Use of the
Internet for Terrorist Purposes asked countries to make submissions for
the 2009 Report, only two states listed cyber-attacks by terrorists as one
of the threats that concerned them. 150 This is contrasted by the rapid
development of cyber-defensive and cyber-offensive capabilities by the
US, China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, 151 Israel, the UK, and others, suggesting
that these states favor exercising their right of individual self-defense
(against cyberterrorists) over collective action in the future.
In fact, two states stand out for their continuous practice of using force
against terrorists and states harboring them—namely Israel and the
United States. 152 Both sometimes operate outside legal obligations and
both are known to invest heavily in military counter-terrorism campaigns. 153
Despite the condemnation by the Security Council of its “selfdefense” operations against previous terrorist attacks, 154 such as the raid
on Beirut airport in 1968 (Resolution 262), raids on Lebanon in 1973
(Resolutions 332 and 337), bombing of PLO Headquarters Tunisia in
1985 (Resolution 573), and assassination of Khalil al-Wazir in 1988
(Resolution 611), Israel continues to stand by its position of interpreting
the right to self-defense broadly and is likely to do so in relation to
cyberterrorist-strikes as well. One should note that although the
international community seems to remain unconvinced by Israeli
arguments, after 9/11 states do not explicitly exclude the possibility of
acting in self-defense against organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas, 155
and prefer to concentrate instead on issues of proportionality in assessing

149. Lukasz Jachowicz, How to Prevent and Fight International and Domestic
Cyberterrorism and Cyberhooliganism 1 (2010) (unpublished essay), available at http://
honey/7thguard.net/essays/cyberterrorism-policy.pdf.
150. U.N. COUNTER-TERRORISM IMPLEMENTATION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON COUNTERING
THE USE OF THE INTERNET FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES 3 (Feb. 2009), available at http://
www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/ctitf_internet_wg_2009_report.pdf.
151. W.P. Strobel, A Glimpse of Cyberwarfare, 128 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 32
(2000), cited in Joe Wesley Moore, Information Warfare, Cyber-Terrorism and Community
Values 24 n.66 (2002) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, McGill University), available at
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=458383.
152. Devika Hovell, Chinks in the Armour: International Law, Terrorism and the
Use of Force, 27 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 398, 412 (2004).
153. See generally, e.g., AMY BELASCO, THE COST OF IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND
OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11 (2011).
154. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 116 (2000).
155. Raphaël van Steenberghe, Self-Defense in Response to Attacks by Non-state
actors in the Light of Recent State Practice: A Step Forward?, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 183,
193 (2010).
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the legality of the airstrike near Damascus in 2003, invasion of Lebanon
in 2006, 156 and bombings of Gaza in 2007–2012.
The condemnation of US “self-defense” against terrorists was not
likely in the Security Council due to the US veto. Nonetheless, the General
Assembly managed to pass Resolution 41/38 condemning the bombings
of Libyan Jamahiriya in 1986 carried out in response to the Berlin
discotheque bombing. United States’ “counter-terrorist” operations in Iraq
in 1993, as well as in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, 157 continued to raise
questions of legality until 2001, when the Security Council in its Resolution
1368 heavily implied that the US has the right to resort to self-defense
against a terrorist organization. This was affirmed by the silent approval
of the international community of the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001
and also by the legal attitudes adopted in the US itself (“president has
both constitutional and statutory authority to use the armed forces in
military operations, against terrorists, within the United States”158), which
inevitably will reflect on cyberterrorism as well.
Other countries have also invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter to
justify attacks against terrorist groups with mixed feedback. For example,
reactions to numerous Turkish incursions into Northern Iraq in the last
two decades to pursue the Kurdistan Workers Party have ranged from
understanding 159 to a “mixture of sympathy and concern.” 160 Further
examples where self-defense arguments were used in relation to terrorists
include Russian pursuit of Chechen fighters into Georgia, 161 Iranian
attacks on Iraqi bases of People’s Mujahedin and Kurdish bands, 162
involvement of Ethiopia in the Somali Civil War in 2006, 163 Colombian

156. Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L.
359, 379 (2009).
157. See id. at 359, 380.
158. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and
Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President,
and William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense 37 (Oct. 23,
2001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/milforce.pdf.
159. Steenberghe, supra note 156, at 194; see also GRAY, supra note 155, at 103.
160. Tams, supra note 156.
161. Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to SelfDefense Post-9/11, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 244, 253 (2011).
162. Tams, supra note 156, at 380.
163. NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 30
(2010).
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invasion of the Ecuadorian territory in 2008 to engage the FARC, 164 and
Kenyan pursuit of Al Shabaab in 2011.
Although these examples do not directly involve cyberterrorists, they
demonstrate how states might react to serious cyber-strikes from nonstate actors. This is particularly important, since not a single country to
this day has admitted an attempt to carry out a cyber-attack, and it is
expected that non-state actors are more likely to engage in such activity.
From the perspective of international law, branding a group or
organization with cyber-offensive capabilities “terrorist” is not enough. 165
In order for a state to exercise its right of self-defense against a
cyberterrorist group, the latter should launch (or, arguably, plan to launch) a
cyber-strike that would constitute both an illegal “use of force” and an
“armed attack.”
Although the ICJ concluded in the Wall Case that “Article 51 recognizes
the existence of an inherent right of self-defense in the case of armed
attack by one state against another state,” 166 the Court did not bother to
note that the right to defend itself against aggressive non-state actors has
existed in customary international law (i.e. outside Article 51) since
ancient times. 167 Furthermore, as pointed out by Judge Higgins, there is
nothing in the text of Article 51 stipulating that “self-defense is available
only when an armed attack is made by a State.” 168
The massive support for the legality of the US claim to self-defense in
Afghanistan, mentioned above, 169 did not necessarily constitute “instant
customary international law and an authoritative reinterpretation of the

164. Tams, supra note 156, at 380.
165. Walker, supra note 59, at 627.
166. Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J 136, ¶ 128 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall Case]. This
conclusion can be considered an example of “unhelpful caution in using the judicial
tools at its disposal and a reluctance to pronounce clearly on matters of contemporary
importance.” Id.; see David McKeever, The Contribution of the International Court of
Justice to the Law on the Use of Force: Missed Opportunities or Unrealistic
Expectations?, 78 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 361, 396 (2009).
167. See generally Yaroslav Shiryaev, Circumstances Surrounding the Separation
Barrier and the Wall Case and Their Relevance for the Right of Self-Defense, 14 GONZ.
J. INT’L L. 1 (2010), available at http://www.gonzagajil.org/index.php?option=com
content&view=article&id=206:circumstances-surrounding-the-separation-barrier-andthe-wall-case-and-their-relevance-for-the-&catid=83:volume-14-issue-1-2010-2011&Itemid=26.
168. Wall Case, 2004 I.C.J at ¶ 128 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
169. Shiryaev, supra note 167; see generally Dominika Svarc, The Military
Response to Terrorism and the International Law on the Use of Force, 1 POL. PERSPECTIVES 1
(2007), available at http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/
08/CIP-2007-01-03.pdf.
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UN Charter.” 170 In fact, some authors have argued that the US has not
asked for legal approval of its military operation in the UNSC 171 and
instead chose to invoke self-defense individually, in order to avoid creating
a precedent. 172 Nonetheless, one has to acknowledge that enough time
has passed to speak of a natural non-instant evolution of the customary
norms. Today, the question is no longer whether terrorist (and cyberterrorist)
groups can conduct an “armed attack,” but rather the degree to which
state involvement is necessary “to allow the use of force against the
territory of the host state.” 173
Currently there are two opposing views in international jurisprudence.
A majority of the ICJ judges in the Armed Activities case agreed that if
the attacks by “armed bands” were not attributable to a state, there are no
legal circumstances for the exercise of a right of self-defense against that
state. 174 On the other hand, Judge Kooijmans 175 and Judge Simma 176
have defended a position that “armed attacks . . . by irregular bands . . .
are still armed attacks even if they cannot be attributed to the territorial
state.” This view is supported, for example, by Leiden Policy
Recommendations on Counter-Terrorism and International Law, which
reads: “it is now well accepted that attacks by non-state actors, even
when not acting on behalf of a state, can trigger a state’s right of . . .
self-defense.” 177 Steenberghe offers a reasonable compromise between
the two opinions, which seems to reflect state practice (taking into
account the self-defense operations mentioned above): the link between
the non-state actors and a host-country should consist at least in
unwillingness or inability to stop the attacks. 178
170. CHRISTIAN HENDERSON, THE PERSISTANT ADVOCATE AND THE USE OF FORCE:
THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE JUS AD BELLUM IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
158 (2010).
171. Geir Ulfstein, Terrorism and the Use of Force, 34 SECURITY DIALOGUE 153,
153-68 (2003).
172. Said Mahmoudi, Self-Defence and International Terrorism, 48 SCANDINAVIAN
STUD. L. 203, 206 (2005).
173. GRAY, supra note 154, at 99.
174. Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005
I.C.J. 168, ¶ 146-47 (Dec. 19).
175. Id. at 216, ¶ 30-31 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans); see also YORAM
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 216 (3d ed. 2001).
176. Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005
I.C.J. 168 at 334, ¶ 12 (Dec. 19) (separate opinion of Judge Simma).
177. Nico Schrijver & Larissa van den Herik, Leiden Policy Recommendations on
Counter-terrorism and International Law, 57 NETH. L. REV. 531, 541-42 (2010).
178. Steenberghe, supra note 155, at 197, 202; Andrea Bianchi, Terrorism and
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In the context of cyberterrorism, this means that countries that control,
support, 179 take advantage of, or tolerate cyberterrorist-attacks (reaching
significant threshold) originating from their territories can be targeted in
self-defense 180 (subject to necessity and proportionality criteria). If
strikes emanated from parts of a failed state that the government cannot
control, those territories would also be subject to acts of self-defense.
Although this is unlikely, a problem may arise when a government
does not want to tolerate acts of cyberterrorism (e.g., it has ratified an
anti-terrorist convention that demands extradition or prosecution), but it
cannot locate the perpetrators. This is especially relevant if a devastating
cyber-attack was carried out by only one person. Military operations
against parts of a country in pursuit of only one man are not unheard of
(consider Osama bin Laden), yet they will inevitably raise questions of
proportionality. Since such situations are not covered by international
law, the host-state is left with the only option of turning to the Security
Council.
B. Armed Attacks by Cyberterrorists
When it comes to the magnitude of cyberterrorist-attacks necessary to
reach the “armed attack” threshold, one can draw parallels with previous
cases. For example, taking control of a UAV and flying it into a civilian
building resonates with 9/11 and by analogy with the principles in
UNSC Resolution 1368, that the victim-state should be entitled to selfdefense. Life-threatening attacks upon diplomatic personnel and attacks
upon their liberty constituted an “armed attack” in the Tehran Hostages
case. 181 An attack against a single ship triggered the right of self-defense
in the Oil Platforms case. 182 From the ICJ’s attitude in the Nuclear
Weapons case also follows that the release of radiation could be an
armed attack that “would affect health, agriculture, natural resources and

Armed Conflict: Insights from a Law & Literature Perspective, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1, 7
(2011); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, Judgment, 1986
I.C.J 14, ¶ 195 (June 27). It follows that supply of software and “other support” by the
host-state will not constitute an “armed attack” itself, however this would make a country a
state-sponsor of terror, allowing the victim-state to resort to self-defense (possibly
preemptively) against it.
179. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27).
180. T. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTIONS AGAINST THREATS AND
ARMED ATTACKS 53-54 (2002), quoted in Oliver Corten, The Controversies Over the
Customary Prohibition on the Use of Force: A Methodological Debate, 16 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 803, 803 (2006).
181. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 57, 91 (May 24).
182. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 72 (Nov. 6).

178

SHIRYAEV PAGES EDIT (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 14: 139, 2012]

10/24/2016 4:56 PM

Cyberterrorism
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

demography over a wide area [and] has the potential to damage the
future environment, food and marine ecosystem, and to cause genetic
defects and illnesses in future generations.” 183
Some cases of cyberterrorism can also be safely excluded from the
self-defense framework—for example, stealing funds for a terrorist
organization through the Internet would not even reach the level of “use
of force.” Merely exercising control over a UAV or destroying centrifuges
in a uranium enrichment facility cannot reach the “armed attack” threshold
due to their low intensity.
Much will depend on the individual circumstances of each situation
and, most likely, political circumstances. However, it is essential to
maintain an optimal threshold for invoking the right of self-defense in
international law—a very low threshold will blur the lines between
armed conflict and criminal law enforcement, while a very high one will
put states at risk. 184
C. Necessity and Proportionality in Context
As in the case of ordinary cyber-strikes, the exercise of self-defense
against devastating acts of cyberterrorism requires the response to be
necessary and proportional. This is particularly important in light of the
legal uncertainty surrounding terrorism 185 (Gazzini notes that terrorist
attacks consisted of mostly “unpredictable, sudden and instantaneous
acts,” 186 but cyber-attacks take this to a whole new level). Legally
controversial “defensive” acts, such as targeted killings 187 may be
practiced against cyberterrorists or new “targeted hacking” (taking over
183. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 35 (July 8).
184. Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights
Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1–34 (2004).
185. TOM RUYS, “ARMED ATTACK” AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER 487
(2010); JOHN JANŽEKOVIČ, THE USE OF FORCE IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
MORALITY AND PRACTICALITIES 103 (2006).
186. Tarcisio Gazzini, The Rules on the Use of Force at the Beginning of the XXI
Century, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 319, 330 (2006).
187. See generally Peter M. Cullen, The Role of Targeted Killing in the Campaign
against Terror, 48 JOINT FORCE Q. 22 (2008); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Defining Armed
Conflict, 13 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 393, 400 (2008); Kenneth Anderson, Targeted
Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law 11 (May 11, 2009) (unpublished
working paper of the Series on Counterterrorism and American Statutory Law Project
with the Brookings Institution, the Georgetown University Law Center, and the Hoover
Institution) (on file with author).
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or manipulating enemy systems) 188 may be employed in the framework
of future “war on cyberterrorism.” This is especially relevant since some
states started authorizing remote searches of computers of suspected
criminals. 189
Generally, cyberterrorism calls for a reinterpretation of the principles
of necessity and proportionality in a new light. Not only will the states
be required to present clear and convincing evidence of the need to use
force in self-defense 190 to acts that are not easily traceable, but they will
also have to explain why persons, some of which never held a gun in
their hand, should be targeted militarily. Finally, one should also note
that the “luck factor” 191 eliminates the distinction between preemption
and prevention in anticipatory self-defense, since the moment of
“immediacy” becomes impossible to predict. Resorting to preemptive
self-defense legally, therefore, is only possible if cyberterrorist-attacks
keep rising in magnitude, possibly reaching the “armed attack” level
with the next strike, or if there is a series of identical devastating cyberattacks and a state learns it is next on the list.
D. Needle-Prick Theory
In 1989 (before the Internet became global) Antonio Cassese claimed
that “to qualify as an armed attack, international law requires that
terrorist acts form part of a consistent pattern of violent terrorist action
rather than just being isolated or sporadic attacks.” 192 Modern cyber-

188. See generally MINISTERIE VAN BINNERLANDSE ZAKEN EN KONINKRIJKSRELATIES,
JIHADIS AND THE INTERNET (2007), available at http://www.investigativeproject.org/
documents/testimony/226.pdf.
189. Juan Carlos Ortiz Pradillo, Fighting Against Cybercrime in Europe: The
Admissibility of Remote Searches in Spain, 19 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST.
363, 374 (2011).
190. Andrew Garwood-Gowers, Self-Defence Against Terrorism in the Post-9/11
World, 4 QUEENSLAND U. TECH. L.J. 1, 16 (2004).
191. Luck-factor cannot be underestimated in terrorist attacks, and will be equally
significant in cyberterrorism which is even harder to plan. Consider, for example, the
entire auspicious 9/11 operation, or the unlucky Aum Shinrikyo criminal group, which
attempted to disseminate botulinum toxin and anthrax at least nine times, failing each
time because the agents were not toxic enough or sprayers meant to disseminate the
anthrax became clogged and inoperative. Eventually, the successful Sarin attack on the
Tokyo subway had to be carried out by disseminating the nerve gas in plastic trash bags
and poking them with sharpened umbrella tips. See Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism by
Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Reassessment of the Threat, in TRANSNATIONAL
THREATS: BLENDING LAW ENFORCEMENT AND MILITARY STRATEGIES 85, 92 (Carolyn W.
Pumphrey ed., 2000).
192. Niaz A. Shah, Self-Defence, Anticipatory Self-Defence and Pre-Emption:
International Law’s Response to Terrorism, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 95, 107
(2007), citing Antonio Cassese, The International Community’s “Legal” Response to
Terrorism, 38 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 589, 596 (1989).
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attacks represent a completely different phenomenon—an ongoing pattern
of attempts to gain entry into a system with a relatively low chance of
success, mostly against “serious” targets. Although it may very well be
easier to sneak explosives on board a plane than to crash it using a
computer, cyberterrorism is not impossible and, as mentioned previously,
becomes more feasible as technologies develop.
Cyberterrorism can also take the form of multiple cyber-attacks on
random targets (e.g., hospital computers of a country). As in the case of
traditional terrorism, in this context “account may be taken of a series of
attacks emanating from the same territory and the same terrorist
group.” 193
The ICJ did imply that attacks can be “cumulative in character” in its
Oil Platforms 194 and Armed Activities cases. 195 Also, as Christian J.
Tams notes, 196 a large number of states accepted Turkey’s and Israel’s
claims to self-defense “by implication”, as they involved constant smallscale terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, the needle-prick theory (or
accumulation of events theory) has never been officially endorsed either
by the Security Council, 197 a majority of prominent academics, or the
ICJ itself. According to this doctrine, instead of measuring the severity
of each individual attack, consideration should be given to the
cumulative effect of a series of attacks, 198 whereby rather than expiring
immediately after a single attack, “the right to self-defense survives it
and allows States to take forcible action necessary to put an end to the
chain of attacks.” 199

193. Schrijver & van den Herik, supra note 178, at ¶ 39; see Bradley K. Ashley,
Anatomy Of Cyberterrorism: Is America Vulnerable? 34 (Feb. 27, 2003) (unpublished
research paper submitted for graduation requirements), available at http://www.au.af.
mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/ashley.pdf (stating that the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency
used five factors in 2003 for assessing the level of cyberterrorist threat: existence,
capability, intentions, history, and targeting).
194. Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005
I.C.J. 168, ¶ 146 (Dec. 19).
195. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 64 (Nov. 6).
196. Tams, supra note 156, at 388.
197. Szabó notes that, although the Security Council has been reluctant to accept
the needle-prick theory, the Council became less willing to condemn it in the 1980s
(particularly in relation to Israeli self-defense wars). See KINGA TIBORI SZABÓ,
ANTICIPATORY ACTION IN SELF-DEFENCE: ESSENCE AND LIMITS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 215 (2011).
198. Garwood-Gowers, supra note 190, at 7.
199. Tarcisio Gazzini, The Rules on the Use of Force at the Beginning of the XXI
Century, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 319, 331 (2006).
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This theory must be mentioned in the context of cyberterrorism, since
at least two of the states that possess serious cyber-offense capabilities—
the US and Israel 200—have resorted to the “cumulative effect” approach
in the past, specifically in response to acts of terror. 201 Due to the “luck
factor,” cyberterrorist-strikes are less intensive in their nature than
traditional terrorist attacks, and therefore, it is more probable that a
series of damaging attacks (e.g., a pattern of random assassinations via
computerized medical-equipment in one state) can provoke the victimstate to resort to the needle-prick doctrine.
As in the case of conventional response, self-defense against
cyberterrorism is bound to have the same vices: the response will seem
like a reprisal; it will cross the allowed borders of preemptive action (see
above), 202 and it will be disproportionate to the cyber-attack in
isolation. 203 Even if the needle-prick theory will be recognized in the
future in customary international law vis-à-vis cyberterrorism (which
this author finds highly unlikely), it will be subject to the same limits
that are applicable to traditional self-defense: necessity, proportionality,
lack of other means, as well as expiration of the right to continue selfdefense after the Security Council has taken action. Until either the
UNSC or the ICJ admit the legality of the needle-prick approach, or until
there is sufficient evidence to suggest that this theory is incorporated
into international customary law, accumulating cyberterrorist-strikes
short of “armed attack” for the purpose of invoking self-defense will
remain illegal.
V. CYBERTERRORISM AND JUS IN BELLO
A. General Complexities
According to Andrea Bianchi, international humanitarian law is
sufficiently well suited to provide a “regulatory framework” and “effective
mechanisms” to punish acts of terrorism. 204 Condorelli and Naqvi add
that it condemns acts of terrorism in both international and internal
conflicts and offers a system for the prosecution and punishment of

200. South Africa and Portugal were among other states that resorted to this
doctrine. See GRAY, supra note 154, at 108.
201. See Shiryaev, supra note 167, at 17.
202. Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainties of the Law on Self-Defence in the United
Nations Charter, 35 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 143, 177 (2004).
203. Id; see also STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (1996).
204. Bianchi, supra note 178, at 21.
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those who perpetrate them. 205 Unlike human rights law, humanitarian
law takes into account the violent or systematic nature of terrorist acts
perpetrated during conflicts, 206 although jus in bello suffers from its own
set of deficiencies when it comes to terrorism and, by extension, cyberterrorism.
The dividing line between use of force and humanitarian law is
blurred 207 by the nature of terrorist acts which might or might not initiate
an “armed conflict,” depending on particular circumstances. In fact, in
the Kordić and Čerkez judgment, the ICTY stated that the protraction
requirement is “significant in excluding . . . single acts of terrorism.” 208
One must therefore assume that single cyberterrorist-strikes cannot
initiate a war, though the events after 9/11 paradoxically imply the opposite.
Additional complexities stem also from the controversial nature of the
recent counter-terrorism operations (“war on terror”), 209 which only
partially correspond to the classic understanding of war. 210 Nevertheless,
it remains clear that international humanitarian law would apply in
situations where a cyberterrorist-attack is carried out as part of an armed
conflict (or armed occupation) with the required nexus, 211 or if it triggers
the armed conflict itself.

205. Luigi Condorelli & Yasmin Naqvi, The War Against Terrorism and Jus in
Bello: Are the Geneva Conventions Out of Date?, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW
NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 37 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004).
206. Fionnuala Ni Aoláin, The No-Gaps Approach to Parallel Application in the
Context of the War on Terror, 40 ISR. L. REV. 563, 579 (2007); see also Gabor Rona,
Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the “War on
Terror”, in TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 154, (Magnus Ranstorp & Paul Wilkinson
eds., 2008).
207. Neta C. Crawford, Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War, 1
PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 5, 20 (2003).
208. Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 341 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004); see also
Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶ 41 n.60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007).
209. See generally Marja Lehto, War on Terror—Armed Conflict with Al-Qaida?,
78 NORDIC J. OF INT’L L. 499 (2010).
210. See Natasha T. Balendra, Defining Armed Conflict 2511 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law,
Pub. Law & Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-22, 2007), available
at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1062&context=nyu_plltwp; see also
Matthew C. Waxman, The Structure of Terrorism Threats and the Laws of War, 20
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 429, 429 n.3 (2010).
211. See Schrijver & van den Herik, supra note 177, at ¶ 60.
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B. Special Nature of Terrorism in International Humanitarian Law
Terrorism is equally prohibited in times of internal or international
armed conflicts. 212 Like other attacks, violent acts of cyberterror are
subject to the principles of necessity, proportionality, humanity, distinction,
neutrality, and chivalry. At the same time, Geneva Conventions protocols
specifically forbid 213 “all measures of . . . terrorism,” “acts of terrorism,” 214
and “acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population.” 215 Acts of terrorism are
expressis verbis listed as war crimes in the statutes of the ICTR 216 and
Sierra Leone Special Court, 217 as well as the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind.218 Though of little relevance
in the context of cyber-attacks (for reasons mentioned previously), one
should note that international humanitarian law separately prohibits 219
and criminalizes 220 a particular extremist act—hostage taking.

212. U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility:
Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, ¶ 164(b), U.N. Doc
A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004); see also Hans-Peter Gasser, Acts of Terror, “Terrorism” and
International Humanitarian Law, 84 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 547–68 (2002).
213. ERLING J. HUSABØ & INGVILD BRUCE, FIGHTING TERRORISM THROUGH
MULTILEVEL CRIMINAL LEGISLATION 373 (2009).
214. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 4(2)(d),
June 10, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17513 [hereinafter Protocol II].
215. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 51(2), June
10, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17512; Protocol II, supra note 216.
216. Statute for the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 33 I.L.M. 1602 [hereinafter
ICTR Statute], available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html, adopted
by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
217. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment
of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 3(d), U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).
218. Draft of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 20(f)(iv),
Rep. of the Intl’ Law Comm’n, 48th Sess., May 6- July 26, 1996, UN Doc. A/51/10
(1996).
219. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Common Article 3]; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 34 & art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, supra note 215,
at art. 75(2)(c); Protocol II, supra note 214, at art. 4(2)(c).
220. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 217, at art. 3(c); Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, art. 8, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, July 17, 1998, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/Rome_Statute_ICC/Rome_ICC_toc.html. Note
that negotiations on including “terrorism” as an international crime under the Rome
Statute have been underway for more than a decade. See id.; PETER J. VAN KRIEKEN,
TERRORISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 109 (2002).
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Currently, the archaic notion of terrorism in international humanitarian
law differs from the conventional one. 221 The main reason for this
paradox is that unlike the latter, the concept of jus in bello terrorism
exists in a legal stasis. It has not changed since 1949. When the Geneva
Conventions were written, terrorism was perceived as a form of
intimidation 222 and collective punishment 223 by a state. Article 33(1) of
the Fourth Geneva Convention was therefore aimed at preventing
belligerents from the practice of “intimidatory measures to terrorize the
population.” 224 Building upon this foundation, the 1977 protocols
reaffirmed the archaic understanding of terrorism. 225
A de facto separate legal regime was proclaimed by the ICTY in the
Galić case, where the Court noted that although international instruments
exist to outlaw terrorism in various forms, the Court had to limit itself to
the Geneva framework of conventional armed conflict between states
and ignore the “international efforts directed against ‘political’ varieties
of terrorism.” 226 However, it is undeniable that some of these political
varieties were any way incorporated into the laws of armed conflict by
the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention (currently ratified by 176
states), which suggests that any cyber-attack intended to cause death or
221. Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, The Complementary Nature of Human Rights Law,
International Humanitarian Law and Refugee Law, in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 50 (2002), available at http://www.iihl.org/iihl/
Album/terrorism-law.pdf.
222. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, DRAFT RULES FOR THE LIMITATION OF THE
DANGERS INCURRED BY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN TIME OF WAR (1957). Article 6
reads: “Attacks directed against the civilian population, as such, whether with the object
of terrorizing it or for any other reason, are prohibited.” Id.
223. John B. Bellinger III, Terrorism and Changes to the Laws of War, 20 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 331, 336 (2010) (stating that collective punishment is prohibited by
Article 33(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 75(2)(d) of Additional Protocol
I, and Article 4(2)(b) of Additional Protocol II).
224. Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; see also CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL.,
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1375 (1987), cited in VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL
P. SCHARF, ICTR FOR RWANDA 213 (1998).
225. Protocol II, supra note 214 (extending to cover “not only acts directed against
people, but also acts directed against installations which would cause victims as a sideeffect”); see INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE 1977 PROTOCOLS
¶ 4538 (Y. Sandoz et al. eds., 1987), cited in BEN SAUL, TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2006); COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, supra note 224.
226. Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 81 (Nov. 30,
2006), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/acjug/en/gal-acjud061130.pdf.
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injury to civilians or persons hors de combat 227 during armed conflict
should be considered an act of terror not only if carried out to intimidate
a population, but also if used to compel a government or an organization
to do or abstain from doing any act. 228 At the same time, since mere
threats of violence and non-violent acts were left out of the definition
contained in the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention, they cannot be
considered jus in bello terrorism if their purpose is to simply coerce a
state and not to intimidate its population.
As international humanitarian law is primarily meant to govern the
behavior of state armies (see next sub-chapter for the discussion on
freedom-fighters), cyber-attacks can be classified as archaic jus in bello
terrorism if carried out by military agents of countries (in case of
international armed conflict) or of organized groups controlling parts of
state territory (in case of internal armed conflicts). Those persons and
groups that do not fall under the combatant categories will anyway be
covered by the legal regime on conventional terrorism. On the other
hand, the activities undertaken by military forces of a state are excluded
from this regime by special provisions in the 2005 Protocol to the
Maritime Convention, 229 the 2010 Protocol to the Unlawful Seizure
Convention, 230 the 2010 Nuclear Terrorism Convention, 231 and the 2010
New Civil Aviation Convention. 232 Therefore, soldiers who hijack a
civilian UAV and crash it into a building or cause a nuclear meltdown in
another state through cyber-attacks during an armed conflict cannot be
held liable for conventional terrorism.
One must note that a similar exception in relation to all armed forces
within the meaning of international humanitarian law, suggested by the
West in the Draft Comprehensive Convention, 233 is still disputed. There
is a lack of sufficient ratification of the four above-mentioned instruments,

227. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 173 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d
ed. 2008).
228. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
supra note 98, at art. 21(1)(b).
229. IMO, 2005 Protocol to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, supra note 2.
230. ICAO, Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, supra note 26.
231. Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 119, at art. 4(2).
232. Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International
Civil Aviation, supra note 2, at art. 6(2).
233. “The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are
understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are
not governed by this Convention.” Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm. Established by G.A. Res.
51/210, supra note 53, at 17.
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and, as a result, no solid customary law 234 in this regard exists. Whatever
the outcome, such exception does not necessarily represent a legal gap
since such acts would still be punishable as war crimes and can be
somewhat characterized as terrorism, albeit an archaic form (that of jus
in bello).
C. Freedom-Fighters in Cyber-Space
The maxim coined by Gerald Seymour that “one man’s terrorist is
another man’s freedom fighter” accurately reflects one of the most
difficult obstacles in coping with terrorism and is no less relevant when
discussing cyberterrorism. 235 History knows many examples when the
label of “freedom fighters” was earned in resistance to illegitimate actions:
colonization, aggression, illegal occupation, tyranny, totalitarianism, and
even international crimes and massive human rights violations. 236
Nevertheless, this title is still yet to be recognized in cyber-space.
The 1977 Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I officially provide
freedom fighters with combatant and prisoner-of-war status if they
belong to peoples who are “fighting against colonial domination, alien
occupation or racist regimes in the exercise of their right of selfdetermination” 237 Despite making applicability of the Geneva Conventions
somewhat dependent upon motivations that inspire guerillas, 238 these
three cases are widely recognized as permitting liberation wars. This is
partially evidenced by a vast number (170) of state-ratifications of the

234. “The processes of customary international law work best when all international
actors realize that there is much at stake” David J. Bederman, Acquiescence, Objection
and the Death of Customary International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 31, 44
(2010).
235. See generally Boaz Ganor, Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist
Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?, 3 POLICE PRACTICE & RES. 287 (2002), available at
http://www.ict.org.il/ResearchPublications/tabid/64/Articlsid/432/Default.aspx; see also
Zahri Yunos, Putting Cyber Terrorism into Context, STAR IN-TECH (2009), available at
http://www.cybersecurity.my/data/content_files/13/526.pdf.
236. See Frédéric Mégret, Beyond “Freedom Fighters” and “Terrorists”: When, If
Ever, Is Non-State Violence Legitimate in International Law?, 6-13 (2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1373590.
237. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts, arts. 1(4), 43(1), 43(2) & 44(1), Jan. 23, 1979, 1125 U.N.T.S. 6.
238. Francisco J. Contreras & Ignacio De La Rasilla, Of War As Law and Law As
War, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 765, 775 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1616918.
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Additional Protocol I, 239 with the notable exceptions240 of technologicallyadvanced India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey, and the US. The states of
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation insist upon excluding applicability
of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism in situations
of struggle against foreign occupation. 241
Colonialism, alien occupation and racist regimes can only be
maintained in a physical dimension and therefore cannot be established
online. Nonetheless, this does not eliminate the possibility of fighting for
physical freedom by resorting to cyber-attacks. For example, groups like
Islamic Jihad and G-Force Pakistan have engaged in minor cyber-strikes
with the purpose of liberating Palestine and Kashmir respectively. Their
members can therefore be classified as cyber-freedom-fighters under the
existing international humanitarian law. Like other lawful combatants,
such cyber-guerillas have a set of obligations they must follow, 242 including
“carrying arms openly” 243 (i.e., in reality, warning in advance of an
upcoming attack or using encrypted digital signatures) and, if possible,
wearing uniforms.
If these requirements are fulfilled, the broad and general definition
contained in the Draft Comprehensive Convention cannot be extended to
the lawful freedom-fighters without invalidating Article 1(4) of the
Additional Protocol I; therefore the suggestion of the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (see above) seems more than reasonable and should
be affirmed on the international level.
On the other hand, since the eighteen existing counter-terrorism
instruments are not broad in their scope and criminalize specific extremist
actions, freedom-fighters and cyber-guerillas remain subject to them.
Unlike military forces of a state, they are not excluded from the scope of
239. Siobhan Wills, The Legal Characterization of the Armed Conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq: Implications for Protection, 58 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 173, 207
(2011).
240. For some reasons, see Wayne McCormack, Prosecuting Terrorism—Models
for Confronting Organized Violence, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Part IV (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds., 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1623847; Richard D. Rosen, Targeting Enemy Forces
in the War on Terror: Preserving Civilian Immunity, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 683,
777 (2009).
241. U.N. Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm., 6th Sess., Jan. 28–Feb. 1, 2002 at 7, U.N.
Doc. A/57/37 Annex IV; GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 37 (2002), available at http://
daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/248/17/PDF/N0224817.pdf?OpenElement
(“The activities of the parties during an armed conflict, including in situations of foreign
occupation, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which
are governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention.”).
242. See ALEX P. SCHMID, THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF TERRORISM RESEARCH
68–69 (2011).
243. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts, supra note 237, at art. 44(3).
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the four newest counter-terrorism instruments (see above). This creates a
legal discrepancy where state military is more protected than freedomfighters, even if they are engaged against each other in the same armed
conflict. However, as mentioned before, it does not represent a big
problem practically, as both categories can be held liable for war crimes
and archaic terrorism. Though maybe a political paradox, under
international law, it is possible for one person to be a combatant, a
freedom fighter, and a terrorist (both archaic and conventional).
D. Prisoner of War Status
Jean Pictet rightly noted that “there is no intermediate status in jus in
bello and nobody in enemy hands can fall outside the law.” 244 Since
2002, the US Government contributed to the degradation in protection of
the victims of war 245 by defining Taliban and Al-Qaeda detainees as
unlawful combatants 246 and denying them the prisoner of war status. 247
Although strict opposition from international organizations and academics
did not allow for any change in customary norms, 248 in the future certain
states may likewise attempt to deny this status to cyber-combatants (or
indefinitely detain civilians who have not participated in hostilities).
Currently, a violation of international law, whether in the form of
indiscriminate cyber-attacks or participation in terrorist acts, does not
deprive either state forces or freedom-fighters of their combatant and
244. Jean S. Pictet, Commentary of the Geneva Conventions: Fourth Geneva
Convention, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 51 (1958), available at http://www.
loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-II.pdf.
245. Eric Talbot Jensen, Applying A Sovereign Agency Theory of the Law of Armed
Conflict, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 685, 726 (2012).
246. See, e.g., Avril McDonald, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and the Jus in Bello,
in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 57, 70 (2002),
available at http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Album/terrorism-law.pdf.
For a similar discussion on Israel, see Henning Lahmann, The Israeli Approach to
Detain Terrorist Suspects and International Humanitarian Law: The Decision
Anonymous v. State of Israel, 169 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 347, 357-58 (2009), available
at http://www.zaoerv.de/69_2009/69_2009_2_a_347_364.pdf.
247. For discussion on reasons, see Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International
Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the “War on Terror”, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
55, 65 (2003). Note that the District Court found that Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions was applicable to the Al-Qaeda suspect in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557 (2006).
248. Noëlle Quénivet, The “War on Terror” and the Principle of Distinction in
International Humanitarian Law, 3 COLOM. Y.B. INT’L L. 155, 172 (2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1879133.
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prisoner of war status, as long as they abide by the obligations imposed
upon them by international humanitarian law. 249 Since jus in bello only
prohibits archaic terrorism, in theory, participation in cyber-attacks that
constitute non-overlapping conventional terrorism (e.g., acquiring funds
through cyber-attacks for terrorist purposes) does not remove prisoner of
war privileges.
In determining whether cyber-combatants (or civilians) were involved
in acts of archaic terrorism and whether their legal protection should be
revoked, one must consider that, as in the case of traditional terrorist
organizations, the attackers will belong to a group that consists of cyberattackers, organizers, donors, facilitators, trainers, colleagues who provided
general encouragement but did not participate in the cyber-strikes, and
persons who are engaged in non-related services (cooks, for example)—
each with a different form of responsibility. 250
E. Cyberterrorist Acts in War
Jus in bello (archaic) cyberterrorism includes all acts during an armed
conflict that injure, attempt to injure, and threaten violence to civilians or
persons hors de combat, if their purpose is to intimidate the population.
Such acts may include causing incorrect treatment by tempering with
medical computers, hijacking an enemy’s military UAV and bombarding
civilian objects, 251 disrupting drinking water supply, and releasing
dangerous chemicals in an urban setting, even if those acts do not create
any casualties. 252 There must be a direct intent to intimidate, since
incidental spreading of terror among the civilian population is not illegal
if acts of violence are pursued against lawful targets.253 So, for example,
American “shock and awe” tactic in the early stages of the 2003 Iraq

249. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts, arts. 44(2) & 44(5), Jan. 23, 1979, 1125 U.N.T.S. 23 1979.
250. Gerald l. Neuman, Humanitarian Law and Counterterrorist Force, 14 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 283, 289 (2003); see also Jean-Philippe Kot, Israeli Civilians Versus Palestinian
Combatants? Reading the Goldstone Report in Light of the Israeli Conception of the
Principle of Distinction, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 961, 986 (2011).
251. Michael N. Schmitt, Drone Attacks Under the Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello:
Clearing the “Fog of Law”, 13 Y.B. INT’L HUMAN. L. 311, 320 (2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1801179; Ryan J. Vogel, Drone
Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 101, 124 (2010).
252. See CASSESE, supra note 227, at 174.
253. Kalliopi Chainoglou, An Assessment of Jus in Bello Issues Concerning
Computer Network Attacks: A Threat Reflected in National Security Agendas, 12 ROM. J.
INT’L L. 25, 32 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1809127.
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invasion targeted against Iraqi military was legal, despite being perceived
as terrorism by the civilian population. 254
Directing potentially violent cyber-attacks against civilians or persons
hors de combat (in the form of actions and not threats) must also be
considered archaic terrorism if carried out to coerce a state or an
international organization. In this context one may consider, for example,
de-individuated cyber-assassinations of persons 255 with computerized
pace-makers which serve as a message to the government. Since a
relatively low percentage of the general population would possess such
devices, rather than intimidating ordinary civilians, this act would play
upon the obligation of states to ensure safety of their citizens.
During armed conflicts, acts of conventional terrorism via cyber-space
can only be viewed as an individual crime (see sub-chapter 3) or through
a prism of the principles of necessity, proportionality, humanity,
distinction, neutrality, and chivalry. However, it is more likely than not
that archaic and conventional cyberterrorism will overlap in war.
VI. CONCLUSION
The present Article addressed the legal issues surrounding cyberterrorism.
In the first chapter, the author explains why cyberterrorism should be
described as “the use of electronic networks taking the form of a cyberattack to commit a) a substantive act criminalized by the existing legal
instruments prohibiting terrorism, or b) an act of terrorism under
international customary law.” Further, with a special emphasis on
existing anti-terrorism conventions and customary international law, it
was demonstrated which actors are likely to engage in acts of
cyberterrorism (non-state actors, corporations and individuals), as well
as which targets are protected by law and which aims are to be pursued
by terrorists.
The last two chapters concentrated on permissibility of individual
response to cyberterrorism and applicability of this concept to jus in
bello. The author noted that although generally self-defense in jus ad
bellum is permitted, the controversial legal theories will have trouble
adapting to the realities of cyberterrorism without international support.
The author also highlights the paradoxical situation of two regimes on
254. Brian Whitaker, Flags in the Dust, GUARDIAN, (Mar. 24, 2003, 5:32 EST),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/24/worlddispatch.iraq.
255. See SCHMID, supra note 52, at 84.
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terrorism (archaic and conventional) coexisting during armed conflicts
and its impact on cyberterrorism. Future convergence of these regimes
on political level will require legal coordination of international
organizations.
This Article demonstrates why conventional terrorism by states should
be ruled out as a viable concept in international law. At the same time
the author argues in favor of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
suggestion to exclude freedom-fighters from the applicability of antiterrorism conventions. Major legal gaps identified in this Article include
preservation of prisoner of war privileges by conventional terrorists
during wars, as well as legal discrepancy created by the conventions
regime on terrorism which ensures freedom-fighters and cyber-guerillas
receive less legal protection than military forces of a state despite their
equal status under the Additional Protocol I.
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